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ABSTRACT

Etherton, Kent. PhD, Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2021. Mind
Wandering as a Result of Failed Self-Regulation: An Examination of Novel Antecedents.

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of self-regulatory mechanisms when
predicting mind wandering. I collected data from a sample of undergraduate psychology
students (N = 168) and full-time workers (N = 660). The hypothesized model did not produce
acceptable fit. However, through alternative model testing, I discovered a well-fitting model of
self-regulatory predictors of mind wandering. These results contributed to the literature by
providing evidence that motivational mechanisms significantly predict mind wandering in both
student and work contexts and raise issues relating to 1) the uni- versus multi-dimensionality of
approach and avoid-motivational temperaments, 2) distinctions between goal level, goal
commitment, and other motivational variables, and 3) the need to integrate motivational
mechanisms and predictors into existing models of mind wandering.
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Introduction
Mind wandering is a potentially dangerous psychological phenomenon estimated to occur
during 50% of conscious thought (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Previous research has
attempted to address the notion of consciousness by examining how the mind wanders between
multiple, often unrelated, thoughts. This wandering can be detrimental to performance as less
attention is directed toward one’s current task. Researchers have found evidence of mind
wandering using behavioral markers, physiological measures, and brain activity (Schooler et al.,
2014). Using such measures, research has examined the nomological net surrounding mind
wandering, including important outcomes (e.g., cognitive performance, reading comprehension,
mood) and antecedents (e.g., mindfulness, cognitive ability) of the behavior. However, prior
research has failed to consider the role of self-regulation. Theories of self-regulation describe
the process through which one allocates attentional resources toward a goal (Bandura, 1986;
Carver & Scheier, 1982), and mind wandering reflects the allocation of attentional resources
inward, away from goal-relevant tasks (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014;
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). Thus, mind wandering might be considered a form of selfregulatory failure, and consequently be predicted by self-regulatory variables unaddressed by the
mind wandering literature. Thus, the purpose of my study is to create and test a self-regulatory
model of mind wandering.
Mind Wandering
History. In 1892, William James coined the phrase ‘stream of consciousness’ to describe
the continuous, unending progression of thoughts. This notion served as a framework that was
used for nearly a century as the dominant way of thinking about consciousness. This framework
reflected several assumptions. One assumption of James’ (1892) stream of consciousness was
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that thoughts were occurring in a conscious mind. Another assumption was that the stream
consisted of rich and detailed experiences. Both assumptions were controversial and caused
James’ (1892) stream of consciousness to lose favor as a model of thought. With the discovery
of brain waves in the 1920s, researchers believed James’ (1892) metaphor was insufficient to
capture the oscillatory rhythm observed with brain waves. With the renewed criticism in
combination with a recognition for how difficult it would be to study consciousness empirically,
research on the topic became scarce until the 1980s.
Giambra (1980) was one of the first to study daydreaming, which would eventually be
known as mind wandering. Initially, he measured daydreaming as self-report using three
dimensions. The three dimensions were (1) how vivid the thoughts were, (2) how many thoughts
were guilt/fear based, and (3) how deep into the thought one went. Giambra was interested in
age effects and the changing rate of daydreaming as one progresses through life. Largely
though, researchers ignored daydreaming research until several decades later when it was
renamed mind wandering.
In the early 2000s, neuroimaging renewed researchers’ interest in the process of thought
and consciousness. A burgeoning interest in the topic birthed several theories and definitions.
Of interest was the emergence of the default mode network, a pattern of brain activity activated
during ‘wakeful rest’ (Raichle et al., 2001). The default mode network is active while someone
engages in mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007). This area of the brain
was theorized to be the location of mind wandering in the brain.
More recently, researchers have produced evidence that mind wandering might not be
exclusively associated with the default mode network (Fox et al., 2015). Engaging in mind
wandering also seems to activate non-default mode network areas such as the rostrolateral
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prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula, temporopolar cortex, secondary
somatosensory cortex, and lingual gyrus. This finding demonstrated that mind wandering might
not be isolated in a single area of the brain as previously thought.
Also, research on mind wandering has begun to cross into new fields of research, such as
I/O psychology. Researchers have begun to apply mind wandering to the workplace and
examine what effect it might have on job performance (Dane, 2011). The topic of mind
wandering is somewhat complicated because it can be both helpful and harmful to important
outcomes such as performance and creativity (Baird et al., 2012; Randall, Oswald, & Beier,
2014). To reconcile this incongruence, Dane (2018) proposed that it is not the presence of mind
wandering that matters but the content. Dane’s (2018) mind wandering content model proposed
a distinction between problem-focused mind wandering and emotion-focused mind wandering,
strongly echoing the similar distinction in the stress and coping literature. That is, Dane (2018)
proposed that the content of a mind wandering episode moderated the effect mind wandering has
on important work-related outcomes.
Definitions and distinctions from related constructs. Researchers have defined mind
wandering in several ways. Smallwood and Schooler (2006) defined mind wandering as the
shifting of attentional resources from an external primary task to an internal alternative task.
Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng (2014) proposed an alternative definition of mind
wandering as the shifting of attentional resources from external goals to internal self-generated
thought. Importantly, Smallwood and Schooler (2006) believed mind wandering was a goaldirected activity whereas Andrews-Hanna and colleagues (2014) did not. This incongruence is
particularly odd given that Smallwood was an author on both papers. I believe the incongruence
is a result of the blurry distinction between conscious and unconscious goal directed cognition.
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For example, fantasizing about what one might do the upcoming weekend might be considered
goal-directed activity by some, but not all, researchers. Also, Smallwood (2013) expanded upon
the definition of mind wandering to describe a process-occurrence framework that distinguishes
the onset from the continuance of a mind wandering episode. That is, he defined mind
wandering as both an initial shift and a continual stream of redirected attentional resources.
Two constructs closely related to mind wandering are mindfulness and boredom.
Mindfulness is defined as conscious awareness of both internal and external sources of
information at the current moment (Dane 2011; Dane & Brummel 2014; Good et. al. 2016).
Researchers have defined mindfulness as a related, yet distinct opposing construct to mind
wandering (Dane, 2011). A key difference between mindfulness and mind wandering is that
mindfulness includes attending to external stimuli whereas mind wandering does not.
Exclusively, mind wandering is defined as attending to internal stimuli (i.e., self-generated
thoughts). That is, mindfulness refers to a broader attentional range and mind wandering a
narrower range. Often, mindfulness is described and tested as an antecedent to mind wandering,
such that those high in mindfulness are less likely to engage in mind wandering (Mrazek,
Smallwood, & Schooler 2012; Good et. al. 2016). A key similarity between mind wandering and
mindfulness is that both describe how one may allocate his/her attentional resources. Both
mindfulness and mind wandering involve attentional resources being directed toward internal
stimuli (either to the exclusion or inclusion of external stimuli). Unsurprisingly, mindfulness and
mind wandering are related to similar outcomes such as reading comprehension and cognitive
performance (Good et. al. 2016).
Originally, boredom was defined as an emotion (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) and later
redefined as a transient, emotional state that results from one wanting but being unable to
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participate in some desired activity (Fisherl, 1993). In research using either definition, boredom
was significantly related to depression and negative affectivity. Boredom was described as a
result of either (1) failure to retrieve appropriate information, (2) failure to participate, and/or (3)
attributing the cause of one’s boredom to the environment (thus reinforcing a preexisting bored
state; Eastwood et. al., 2012). A key similarity between boredom and mind wandering is that
both have malleable components associated with negative affectivity and lower mood (Farmer &
Sundberg, 1986; Fisherl, 1993; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). A key difference between
boredom and mind wandering is that researchers consider boredom a state of cognition but mind
wandering a behavior. Because of this distinction, boredom often is considered an antecedent of
mind wandering. That is, when people are disinterested in their current task, they are more likely
to shift their attention inward.
Measurement. There are numerous methods of measuring mind wandering which can
be categorized as either physiological, cognitive, or behavioral.
Researchers have assessed mind wandering using three physiological measures: pupil
dilation, heart rate, and neuroimaging. Researchers use pupilometry and heart rate less often
than neuroimaging, but all provide unique information. In attention research, it is common to
observe larger pupils when participants are paying attention and/or working hard (Unsworth &
Robison, 2018). So, researchers associate a smaller pupil diameter with a greater likelihood that
the participant is mind wandering. Similarly, participants typically have lower heart rates when
they are either bored or mind wandering (Cummings, Gao, & Thornburg, 2016).
Neuroimaging is a physiological measure of mind wandering in which researchers
typically use fMRI to study neurological activation in the brain. This method is important
because it displays both the frequency and duration of a mind wandering episode. Neuroimaging
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studies have discovered that mind wandering occurs primarily within the default mode network
with a few exceptions (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Mason et al., 2007). The default mode
network is the area of the brain associated with a state of ‘wakeful rest’ or when people are
conscious yet inattentive to a specific task. Additionally, McVay and Kane (2010) distinguished
patterns of activation associated with proactive versus reactive responses to mind wandering.
Thus, the authors proposed distinct antecedents of each response (i.e., proactive: intrinsic
motivation, interest; reactive: personal resources, perceived cost of mind wandering). McVay
and Kane’s (2010) findings illustrated an important advantage of neuroimaging, such that it can
provide physiological evidence of discriminant validity for related psychological constructs.
Another advantage is that activation of the default mode network is related to self-reported mind
wandering (Christoff et. al., 2009), demonstrating convergent validity such that there is no longer
a large inferential leap that must be made to assume activation of the default mode network is
representative of mind wandering. An important disadvantage of neuroimaging is the cost
associated with purchasing and maintaining the equipment.
Cognitive measures of mind wandering include state and trait self-report measures.
There are two state measure types: self-caught and experience sampling, and one trait measure
type: self-report. The self-caught method involves asking participants to “press a key whenever
you catch yourself mind wandering.” Self-caught measures capture mind wandering during
tasks and capture only mind wandering of which the participant is consciously aware. A strength
of the self-caught method is that it captures the exact moment one realizes he is mind wandering.
However, self-caught measures interrupt the task at hand, which can introduce error to any
behavioral performance data being captured.
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Experience sampling involves asking participants to retrospectively report the extent to
which they were mind wandering immediately prior. For example, researchers might ask
participants “In previous trials, how aware were you of where your attention was focused?”
Experience sampling does not require participants to be meta-aware of their experience of mind
wandering while it is happening, merely able to report it having happened earlier. For example,
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) used an app which participants could download onto their cell
phones that would randomly notify them to report whether they were mind wandering
immediately prior. Using experience sampling removes the issue of awareness because the
notification the participants received on their phones shocked them out of their mind wandering
states. This allowed conscious awareness of how little attention they were paying to the task at
hand. Another advantage is that self-reported mind wandering is significantly related to
activation of the default mode network (Christoff et. al., 2009), demonstrating convergent
validity. A common limitation of both state self-report measure types is that they cannot capture
the duration of a mind wandering episode in the way neuroimaging can.
Trait self-reported data involves simply asking participants how frequently they engage
in mind wandering in their day-to-day lives. An advantage of trait measures of mind wandering
is that they provide information about one’s general tendency to mind wander. Such measures
can be written to be situation-specific to capture one’s tendency to mind wander in particular
settings. Another advantage is that, similar to experience sampling, trait measures do not require
people to be consciously aware of their mind wandering during the episode. If participants
become retrospectively aware of the occurrence of mind wandering, trait measures can capture
that information. However, it is likely that people do not remember all instances of mind
wandering. That is, trait measures of mind wandering are conservative, such that the actual
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frequency of mind wandering will be higher than the frequency participants can remember. A
disadvantage of trait measures of mind wandering is that they attempt to measure a less salient
mental experience, compared to self-caught or experience sampling, which ask participants about
their recently experienced mind wandering.
Researchers have used many behavioral measures to study mind wandering. Such
measures include gaze duration, reaction time, and performance errors (Schooler et al., 2014).
An issue associated with these measures is the extent to which one can infer these behavioral
symptoms are representative of a specific type of mental activity. That is, perhaps participants
are not engaging in mind wandering when researchers assume they are. This is a considerable
limitation of behavioral measures. However, behavioral measures have advantages such that
they can capture the frequency, and sometimes even the duration, of a mind wandering episode.
Finally, behavioral measures do not interrupt participants when they are completing a task.
Models. There are many key models/theories of how mind wandering occurs. One of
the first, James’ (1892) stream of consciousness metaphor, attempted to describe conscious
processing as a linear progression of thought. Later, Teasdale and colleagues (1995) proposed
the stimulus independent thought model, proposing that mind wandering depends on the amount
of central executive resources. A decade later, this theory was expanded upon through a series of
competing models each contesting the way in which cognitive resources might be related to mind
wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Thomson, Besner, & Smilek,
2015). More recently, researchers have described a distinction between the onset and the
continuance of a mind wandering episode in Smallwood’s (2013) process-occurrence framework
theory. Focusing on the onset, models have proposed an important distinction such that mind
wandering might be initiated either intentionally or unintentionally (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek,
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2013). Largely, research had focused on what mind wandering is, but Smallwood (2013)
described four key hypotheses for how mind wandering occurs. Then, Mittner and colleagues
(2016) proposed a neural model of mind wandering, which makes a neurological distinction
between an off-focus state and an active mind wandering state. Finally, researchers have begun
to consider the importance of thought content when mind wandering, especially in workplace
settings (Dane, 2018). Next, I will describe each of these models in greater detail.
James’ (1892) stream of consciousness is not a testable model but served as a conceptual
metaphor from which many researchers drew inspiration (e.g., Haynes & Rees, 2005; McKiernan
et al., 2006; Wegner et al., 1991). James claimed consciousness was a stream of continuous
experiences, including thoughts, feelings, ideas, sensations, etc. James claimed such experiences
appeared before the conscious mind and then faded. Additionally, he claimed such experiences
had substantial overlap, such that there is no discrete beginning/end to any particular experience.
Rather, each experience fades in or out in such a way that people likely do not notice the change
in focus. As mentioned earlier, the stream of consciousness was assumed to be occurring in a
conscious mind and be full of rich and detailed experiences occurring sequentially. Researchers
have challenged this metaphor with the criticism that thoughts are not always conscious and
sometimes lack depth (Blackmore, 2002).
The stimulus independent thought model defined stimulus independent thoughts as
“thoughts and images unrelated to immediate sensory input”, later becoming synonymous with
mind wandering (Teasdale et al., 1995). Across four experiments, each using different difficult
tasks, Teasdale and colleagues (1995) concluded that the production of stimulus independent
thoughts is dependent on central executive resources. The authors’ findings implied a negative
linear relationship such that the fewer central executive resources one has, the more likely one is
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to mind wander. Subsequent research has considered stimulus independent thoughts as a lack of
central executive resources (e.g., Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). This assumption was not
revisited until a decade later with the swift emergence of multiple theories contesting the role of
cognitive resources in mind wandering.
Three more recent models have addressed the question of how cognitive resources might
be related to mind wandering. Smallwood and Schooler (2006) proposed a resource-depletion
theory, stating that mind wandering required and depleted cognitive resources. That is, the more
cognitive resources available, the more likely one has resources left over from the primary task
to indulge in mind wandering. So, Smallwood and Schooler (2006) suggested a positive
relationship such that more cognitive resources would predict higher frequencies of mind
wandering. McVay and Kane (2009; 2010) countered such a perspective by proposing an
executive control theory, stating that mind wandering represents a failure of the executive control
system. McVay and Kane’s (2009; 2010) theory suggested a negative relationship between
cognitive resources and mind wandering such that cognitive resources are considered the buffer
against as opposed to the fuel for mind wandering. Most recently, Thomson, Besner, and Smilek
(2015) proposed a resource-control theory, integrating the two previous models such that mind
wandering is a result of misallocation of one’s attentional resources. Indeed, mind wandering
requires cognitive resources, but one must consciously or unconsciously allocate resources
toward the mind wandering content instead of his primary task content. If one has a large
amount of cognitive resources that are all being used on the primary task, it is less likely that he
is mind wandering. However, if one has a large amount of cognitive resources that are being
directed toward the mind wandering content, it is more likely he is mind wandering. That is, the
effect of cognitive resources on mind wandering frequency is either positive or negative,

10

moderated by where the resources are being allocated (i.e., either to the mind wandering content
or the primary task).
The process-occurrence framework proposed a distinction between the onset and
continuance of a mind wandering episode (Smallwood, 2013). This framework suggested that
mind wandering research should consider the two processes separately. Often in previous
experimental settings, researchers operationally defined general mind wandering tendencies as
task error, conflating the two. Such conflation raises validity issues regarding the performance
error behavioral measures mentioned earlier. The process-occurrence framework proposed that
the phenomenon of one’s attention drifting away from the current task cannot be considered the
same as task error. Disentangling task error from mind wandering can only be done if
researchers consider attentional shifting (i.e., the onset) and continued failure to correct one’s
distracted attention (i.e., the continuance) as distinct. Another important consideration suggested
by this framework is the context in which one mind wanders. This framework acknowledged
that mind wandering can be harmful and beneficial and that the difference depends on the
cost/benefit of mind wandering in various contexts. For example, mind wandering on the walk
to one’s car might be beneficial because so few resources are required. However, mind
wandering might be harmful if it is done while operating dangerous machinery and taking exams
(Smallwood, 2013). Largely, subsequent research has ignored such recognition of contextual
factors.
Another distinction in the research is the difference between intentional and unintentional
mind wandering (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013). Researchers have defined intentional mind
wandering as purposeful ‘zoning out’, associated with one enjoying, accepting, and tolerating his
experience of mind wandering. Unintentional mind wandering is accidental such that it might
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interfere with productivity and cause unwanted distractions from the current task. Both types of
mind wandering were related to a facet of mindfulness: non-reactivity to inner experience (Seli,
Carriere, & Smilek, 2015). However, the relationship was different for intentional versus
unintentional mind wandering, demonstrating the importance of such a distinction. Intentional
mind wandering was positively related whereas unintentional mind wandering was negatively
related. In a follow-up study exploring the possible role of metacognition in this strange
phenomenon, researchers provided evidence that intentional mind wandering is distinct from
metacognition (Seli et al., 2017).
Prior theories/models largely focused on what mind wandering is, but Smallwood (2013)
described four hypotheses attempting to explain why one mind wanders. The hypotheses were
the decoupling hypothesis, executive failure hypothesis, current concerns hypothesis (Klinger,
1971), and meta-awareness hypothesis (Smallwood, 2013). The decoupling hypothesis stated
that attentional resources ‘decouple’ from their current target to be redirected toward internal,
task-irrelevant thought. Meaning, one’s executive control system redistributes attentional
resources away from a current task and toward the mind wandering content. The executive
failure hypothesis stated that the shifting of attentional resources does not occur while executive
control is engaged, thus implying mind wandering is a failure of one’s executive control system.
So, the decoupling hypothesis stated that executive control is engaged at the onset of mind
wandering whereas the executive failure hypothesis stated that executive control is not engaged
at the onset. The current concerns hypothesis stated that mind wandering occurs insofar as it
allows people to cycle between multiple goals. So, the current concerns hypothesis considered
mind wandering as a potentially beneficial activity to maintain progress when pursuing multiple
goals. Finally, the meta-awareness hypothesis stated that mind wandering is a result of failed
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metacognition. That is, any occurrence of mind wandering must be associated with a lack of
meta-awareness because meta-awareness is required to remedy a mind wandering state.
Subsequent research often cited these four hypotheses for why one’s mind might wander (e.g.,
Seli et al., 2017; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).
In addition to the cognitive models, other researchers have focused on modeling the
neurological structures and activation associated with various mental processes. In Mittner and
colleagues’ (2016) Neural Model, the authors proposed a link between two brain systems
associated with mind wandering: the default mode network and the locus coeruleus
norepinephrine system. Using neurological observations and theorizing, the authors proposed a
distinction between an uncontrolled off-focus state and a controlled mind wandering state. This
distinction was proposed because brain networks associated with cognitive control are
sometimes activated during mind wandering. Such activation suggests the control networks help
maintain a preexisting train of thought and prevent external distractions. Other times, the
networks associated with cognitive control are not activated during mind wandering. A lack of
cognitive control describes a form of mind wandering described as ‘mental drifting’. This
suggests the possibility of unwanted noise in the study of mind wandering, in which off-focus
attention is conflated with active mind wandering states. Additionally, no research has attempted
to integrate the cognitive intentionality theory (Carriere, Seli, & Smilek, 2013) with the
neurological model (Mittner et al., 2016). One might map intentionality onto Mittner and
colleagues’ (2016) model such that intentional mind wandering reflects the active mind
wandering state whereas unintentional mind wandering might reflect the uncontrolled ‘mental
drifting’ state.
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Other models have focused on the content of mind wandering. Dane’s (2018) mind
wandering content model specified which types of mind wandering might be detrimental to task
performance and which types might be productive. Dane (2018) distinguished between problemfocused and emotion-focused mind wandering content. He proposed that problem-focused
content leads to more positive effects of mind wandering on performance whereas emotionfocused leads to more negative effects. For each form of mind wandering content, Dane (2018)
theorized three subcategories: current concerns, mental time travel, and imagination. These three
types of mind wandering manifest in different ways between problem-focused and emotionfocused content. For example, a problem-focused current concern might be work-related, goaldirected concerns facilitating memory and goal pursuit, leading to better performance. However,
an emotion-focused current concern might result in insufficient allocation of cognitive resources
and avoidance behavior, leading to worse task performance. Also, Dane (2018) was focused
particularly on the occurrence of mind wandering in the workplace. Often, such contextual
considerations are absent from mind wandering research. This mind wandering content model
provides a possible explanation for conflicting results regarding the effect of mind wandering on
performance.
Most theories of mind wandering have assessed the behavior in certain contexts. Most
assess mind wandering in the context of sustained attention tasks. Other theories take a
generalized (i.e., non-situation-specific) approach. However, few have considered mind
wandering’s prevalence in workplace settings, specifically (excluding Dane, 2018).
Outcomes assessed by prior research. There are many key outcomes associated with
mind wandering. Mooneyham and Schooler (2013) categorized mind wandering outcomes as
either costs or benefits. Some of the key costs are performance (i.e., reading comprehension,
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cognitive ability tests, task performance), mood, and inability to control automatized behavior.
Some key benefits are creative performance and autobiographical planning. Additionally,
researchers have theorized that mind wandering might be adaptive such that it can result in (a)
relief from boredom, (b) attentional cycling, and (c) dishabituation (Andrews-Hanna,
Smallwood, & Spreng, 2014; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). That is, mind wandering might
facilitate needed (a) stimulation, (b) multiple-goal pursuit, and/or (c) mental breaks. Mind
wandering to positive content might increase stimulation and make one feel better than she was
before if she was previously bored. Also, mind wandering can allow one to think prospectively
about how he might work toward a secondary goal he is not currently working on. Indeed,
prospective planning is associated with mind wandering (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, &
Spreng, 2014). Finally, mind wandering can allow people a mental break if they are currently
feeling overwhelmed by task demands, allowing dishabituation. Such a break likely reduces the
chances of burnout.
As mentioned earlier, researchers have found evidence that mind wandering significantly
impacts performance (Mrazek et al., 2012; Randall, Oswald & Beier, 2014). In a meta-analysis
examining relationships between mind wandering, cognition, and performance, researchers
provided evidence that mind wandering was negatively related to task performance (Randall,
Oswald & Beier, 2014). Also, the negative relationship was stronger for more complex tasks.
The more complex the task, the more important it becomes to maintain on-task focus and
attention. Such results highlight the importance of task characteristics when examining the effect
of mind wandering on performance outcomes to highlight boundary conditions in which mind
wandering might not adversely affect performance. Additionally, mind wandering has
detrimental effects on multiple types of performance, such as reading comprehension and
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cognitive ability performance. In laboratory settings, people reporting more frequent mind
wandering do more poorly on comprehension and the effect is moderated by the complexity of
the reading material (Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013). Research has demonstrated the effect
of mind wandering on cognitive performance in tasks involving sustained attention, working
memory capacity, intelligence testing, and aptitude testing (Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013).
Unsurprisingly, across tasks that require sustained attention, mind wandering is negatively
related to performance.
Research has demonstrated that mind wandering is associated with lower mood (Carriere,
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Despite people mind wandering to
pleasant topics more often than unpleasant and neutral topics, there is a negative main effect of
mind wandering on one’s happiness (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Ruminating on nonpresent thoughts appears to affect mood regardless of the content one ruminates about. Also,
research has demonstrated that ruminative mental states focusing on non-present stimuli are
associated with mental health problems (e.g., Burnette et al., 2009; Papageorgiou & Wells,
2004). Indeed, research has linked mind wandering to states of boredom and/or depression
(Carriere, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008).
Mind wandering can result in a loss of attentional control. In sustained attention to
response tasks (SART), mind wandering is associated with lower performance (Cheyne et al.,
2009). That is, mind wandering can lead people to fail to notice new stimuli as well as fail to
withhold automatized responses. SART is so strongly associated with mind wandering that it is
often used as a behavioral indicator of mind wandering.
However, there are also several positive outcomes associated with mind wandering, such
as creative performance. When given a divergent thinking task, participants provided more
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creative solutions after mind wandering (Baird et al., 2012). However, it is difficult to determine
whether participants mind wander about the task at hand or about other life concerns. If
participants mind wander to irrelevant concerns, perhaps there would be no effect of mind
wandering on creativity. Regardless, such results have demonstrated that creative and cognitive
performance are different. That is, cognitive performance often benefits linearly from attentional
resources whereas creative performance might require an ‘incubation period’ during which one
must take a break from the creative task and return later. These findings highlight the
importance of mind wandering content when predicting important outcomes.
Another positive outcome associated with mind wandering is autobiographical planning.
Often when mind wandering, people think prospectively about future events (D’Argembeau,
Renaud, & Van der Linden, 2011). Neuroimaging research has supported such claims by
demonstrating that the default mode network is in areas of the brain associated with selfreferential or autobiographical mental activity (i.e., core region; Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, &
Spreng, 2014). Mind wandering allows people to plan for future events and consider other
responsibilities or duties they have to the exclusion of their current task. Whereas this function
might have adverse effects on performance, mind wandering may promote healthy prospective
planning within individuals.
Antecedents assessed by prior research. There are many key antecedents associated
with mind wandering. Research has identified mindfulness, cognitive resources, metacognition,
and Big Five factors as being negatively related with mind wandering. Additionally, research
has identified boredom as being positively related with mind wandering.
Mindfulness is defined as conscious awareness of both internal and external sources of
information at the current moment (Dane, 2011; Dane & Brummel, 2014; Good et. al., 2016).
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Researchers have defined mindfulness as a related, yet distinct, opposing construct to mind
wandering (Dane, 2011). Often, mindfulness is described and tested as an antecedent to mind
wandering, such that those high in mindfulness are less likely to engage in mind wandering
(Good et. al., 2016; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). Mindfulness is positively related to
outcomes such as reading comprehension and cognitive performance (Good et. al., 2016). Given
that mindfulness refers to one’s ability to attend to both external and internal stimuli
simultaneously, mindfulness should be related to the frequency with which one’s mind wanders
to internal, task-irrelevant stimuli. Also, based on prior experimental and correlational evidence,
researchers often refer to mindfulness training as the best way to reduce mind wandering
(Jazaieri et. al., 2016; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). Research has demonstrated that
both state-induced mindfulness and dispositional mindfulness are negatively related with mind
wandering (Jazaieri et al., 2016; Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012).
Often, research cites cognitive resources as a predictor of mind wandering (e.g., McVay
& Kane, 2009; Randall, Oswald & Beier, 2014; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Thomson,
Besner, & Smilek, 2015). However, as mentioned earlier, several competing theories have
disputed whether the relationship is positive, negative, or both (depending on how many
resources are being allocated to either the primary task or the mind wandering content;
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; McVay & Kane 2009; Thomson, Besner & Smilek, 2015).
Research addressing this inconsistency has highlighted ‘cognitive flexibility’ (i.e., one’s ability
to transform task unrelated thoughts into task related thoughts; Rummel & Boywitt, 2014) and
time on task (Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014) as key moderators of the relationship between
cognitive resources and mind wandering. Further, models of attention regulation highlight the
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interactive nature of cognitive resources and task characteristics when predicting mind
wandering behaviors (e.g., Randall, Oswald, & Beier, 2014).
Also, researchers have cited a lack of meta-awareness as a reason why one’s mind might
wander (Schooler et al., 2011; Seli et al., 2017; Smallwood, 2013; Smallwood & Schooler,
2015). As mentioned earlier, researchers have attributed mind wandering to a failure of one’s
metacognition to monitor thoughts continuously, called the meta-awareness hypothesis. Further,
metacognition is a critical component in the process of mind wandering such that it can
determine which type of mind wandering occurs: tune outs versus zone outs (Seli et al., 2017).
Tune-outs are made with conscious awareness and intent whereas zone-outs occur without such
awareness. Unsurprisingly, zone-outs are more strongly related to performance decrements.
Also, researchers have learned that incentivizing participants led to greater instances of selfcaught mind wandering and also improved the validity of the self-reported information
(Zedelius, Broadway, & Schooler, 2015). Such findings have demonstrated the importance of
metacognition when predicting mind wandering.
Moreover, researchers have investigated whether the Big Five factors of personality are
related to mind wandering. Indeed, research has demonstrated significant relationships between
mind wandering and conscientiousness (r = -.31 to -.58, p < .01) and neuroticism (r = .22 to .41;
p < .01) across multiple studies (Carciofo et al., 2016). Thus, research has suggested main
effects of personality factors when predicting mind wandering frequency. However, other
research has addressed how personality might influence the content of one’s mind wandering
episode. For example, openness is associated with positive daydreaming content whereas
neuroticism is associated with negative daydreaming content (Zhiyan & Singer, 1997). Thus,
personality is an important predictor of mind wandering, both in frequency and content.
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Originally, researchers defined boredom as an emotion (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986),
which researchers later refined to a transient, emotional state that results from one wanting but
being unable, to participate in some desired activity (Fisherl, 1993). Using either definition,
research suggested boredom was significantly related to depression and negative affectivity.
Researchers have described boredom as a result of (1) failure to retrieve appropriate information,
(2) failure to participate, and/or (3) attributing the cause of one’s boredom to the environment
(thus reinforcing a preexisting bored state; Eastwood et. al. 2012). Both boredom and mind
wandering are associated with negative affectivity and lower mood (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986;
Fisherl, 1993; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). Often, researchers have described ways in which
a bored state might lead to greater instances of mind wandering (Cummings, Gao, & Thornburg,
2016). Cummings, Gao, and Thornburg (2016) proposed a process model such that boredom
leads to frustration and complacency that then leads to performance decrements. However, the
effect of frustration/complacency on performance was moderated by task unrelated thoughts, or
mind wandering. Indeed, researchers have established boredom as a critical antecedent of mind
wandering.
In summary, prior research considered individual differences and correlates of mind
wandering but scarcely attempted to integrate the construct within preexisting theoretical
frameworks. As previously described, many researchers attempted to describe what mind
wandering is and how or why it occurs, but few tried invoking preexisting frameworks and
investigating whether mind wandering would fit within such frameworks. Integrating mind
wandering within preexisting models may change how researchers consider the involved mental
processes. Researchers have attempted to integrate mind wandering into both neurological
(Mittner et al 2016) and cognitive (i.e., boredom; Cummings, Gao, & Thornburg, 2016) models.
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However, the cognitive models focus exclusively on monotonous tasks and their effects on
attentional lapses. However, there are more comprehensive models addressing all forms of task
difficulty, within which mind wandering should fit. One such framework is the thoroughly
researched domain of self-regulation.
Theories of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation describes the process through which one alters one’s behavior. Selfregulation is the motivational process that guides the allocation of time to and effort applied
toward attaining a goal (e.g., Bandura, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1982). An unmotivated person
is unlikely to allocate the appropriate amount of mental resources required to accomplish some
goal.
Two theories describing self-regulatory processes are Control Theory and Social
Cognitive Theory. Control Theory originated in the engineering field and was modified for
human behavior by Carver and Scheier (1982). The process underlying Control Theory is a
negative feedback loop, in which people allocate attentional resources to reduce perceived
discrepancies between current states and desired states.
Control Theory has three main components: standards, monitoring, and operation (Carver
& Scheier, 1982). Standards are ideals or goals a person holds. Monitoring is the process by
which a person compares his actual state to his standards. Operation is the process through
which effort is exerted to reduce perceived discrepancies between the person’s actual state and
his/her standards. The Operation stage assumes appropriate allocation of attentional resources
such that one is actively working to reduce the perceived discrepancy. Also, the Operation stage
assumes one’s efforts lead to behavioral outcomes that cause an observable effect on the
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environment. These three components are considered the primary mechanisms through which
people reduce perceived discrepancies and self-regulate their behavior.
In Social Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1991) suggested that human behavior is regulated
by the ongoing exercise of self-influence (Bandura, 1991). Within self-regulation, there are three
principal subfunctions: self-monitoring of one’s behaviors, judgement of one’s behavior
compared to personal standards and environmental circumstances, and affective self-reactions
(Bandura, 1991). These three subfunctions constitute the structure of this self-regulatory system
and are all influenced by self-efficacy, the belief in one’s ability to execute a particular behavior
successfully (Bandura, 1977). Bandura (1991) claimed self-efficacy is the most central
mechanism of human agency because it influences the subfunctions of the self-regulatory
system.
The self-monitoring subfunction describes the role of self-reflection in the self-regulatory
process. Bandura (1991) described self-monitoring as having a self-diagnostic function,
allowing people to notice patterns about their own behaviors, and a self-motivating function,
allowing people to set realistic goals for themselves as well as monitor their progress toward
accomplishing goals. Self-monitoring can be influenced by many factors such as preexisting
cognitive structures, self-beliefs, perception of one’s functioning, how performance information
is organized for memory encoding, and mood. The likelihood of self-monitoring causing change
in an individual depends on the temporal proximity of the self-monitoring to behavior and the
informativeness of the performance feedback (Bandura, 1991). Similar to an assumption of the
Operation stage in Control theory, the self-monitoring subfunction assumes that one’s behaviors
leave an observable effect on the environment.
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The judgmental subfunction involves a comparison between one’s current state and
various standards. People use this subfunction to determine whether they have achieved their
goal or need to continue allocating resources toward its accomplishment. People acquire
information regarding their goal progress from the self-monitoring subfunction whereas
standards can be acquired through various sources depending on the person’s self-monitoring
orientation (Snyder, 1987). Standards are obtained from an interaction between self-generated
and external sources of influence. Standards represent one’s ideal/ought state (i.e., one’s goal),
which is compared with one’s current state to gauge the discrepancy. The resulting discrepancy
will be used either to exert effort or to cease performing the activity.
The affective self-reaction subfunction is the emotional response to perceiving a
discrepancy between current and ideal/ought states. Self-reactions are considered the
consequences of behavior that cue continued self-regulation. Self-reactions are the outcomes of
the self-monitoring and judgement subfunctions. A person needs to monitor her performance
and compare it to her given standards before knowing how she should feel about her
performance level. Also, self-reactions depend on the perceived performance determinants, or
what factors led to a person’s success or failure. If the person succeeds due to external
determinants, he will be less likely to derive self-satisfaction from his accomplishment. When a
positive self-reaction is anticipated from achieving a given goal, a person becomes more
motivated to accomplish said goal. People pursue activities that produce positive self-reactions
and avoid activities that produce negative self-reactions (Bandura, 1991).
Generally, both theories of self-regulation share a similar structure. That is, through the
process of monitoring one’s current state and judging its similarity to some ideal/ought state, one
perceives a discrepancy that is then minimized through the exertion of effort and attentional
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resources. Then, the resulting state is compared to the ideal/ought state again to see if a
discrepancy still exists. Such processes describe the fundamental discrepancy creation and
reduction process of self-regulation, invoking two critical components of self-regulation: goal
setting and self-efficacy.
Goal setting. Research into goal setting began with the psychological construct level of
aspiration. Dembo (1931) found that when required goals are too difficult, people set
intermediate goals (as referenced in Ricciuti, 1951). She called these intermediate goals the
momentary level of aspiration. The first major study of level of aspiration was done by Hoppe
(1930), who examined the nature of level of aspiration, finding it to fluctuate in response to
perceived success and/or failure (as referenced in Ricciuti, 1951). Often, researchers have
examined how people perceive success and failure when they compare their performance levels
to their levels of aspiration (Lewin et al., 1944; Sears, 1940). Hoppe (1930) conceptualized level
of aspiration as an abstract combination of constantly shifting expectations, goals, and demands
(as referenced in Ricciuti, 1951). Lewin and colleagues (1944) describe the process through
which levels of aspiration affect subsequent performance. One has a prior performance level that
may be acceptable or not, which prompts the setting of a level of aspiration. Setting such a level
produces an “attainment discrepancy” which prompts the exertion of effort. Finally, one
experiences a reaction to their efforts, whether it be a feeling of success, failure, relinquishment
of the level of aspiration, or continuing with a new level of aspiration. Largely, this sequence of
events has remained consistent through subsequent motivational models. Empirically, level of
aspiration was studied as a point of comparison with performance levels. Later, researchers
questioned whether the process of setting goals might engage motivational behavior (Locke,
1968; Locke & Latham, 1990).
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Locke (1968) argued that goals themselves motivate people to take action. Locke (1968)
proposed that goal difficulty is related positively to performance. Also, goals should be specific
because people with specific hard goals typically outperform those with vague or “do your best”
goals. Finally, Locke (1968) argued that behavioral intentions regulate choice behavior. Often,
goals and intentions mediate the effects of external incentives on outcomes.
Locke and Latham extended Locke’s (1968) assertions with Goal-Setting Theory,
suggesting that goals are regulators of human action (e.g., see Locke, 1968; Locke & Latham,
1990 for reviews). Locke and Latham (1990) classified variables that affect the goal setting
process as goal content or goal intensity variables. Goal content variables were related to the
outcome of the goal (e.g., goal level and goal specificity). Goal intensity variables consisted of
factors like goal commitment and the importance of the goal. Research has found goals that are
specific, difficult, and attainable, provided the person is committed to the goals, produce higher
levels of performance (e.g., see Locke & Latham, 1990 for a review).
Prior research has characterized influences on one’s goal choice as consisting of both
approach- and avoidance-based components (Elliot, 1999). Approach and avoidance orientations
are distinct factors such that high/low levels of one does not preclude high/low levels of the
other. Approach goal orientations reflect one’s disposition toward being motivated to pursue a
perceived feeling of accomplishment. Avoidance goal orientations reflect one’s disposition
toward being motivated to avoid stress and other aversive consequences of not accomplishing
some goal. So, individuals with higher levels of approach-goal orientation might be more likely
to set higher goals for themselves, to challenge themselves and produce a greater sense of
accomplishment. Individuals with higher levels of avoidance-goal orientation might be more
likely to adopt a more conservative goal, to minimize their chances of failure and mitigate
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resulting negative affect. Once one adopts a goal, its effect on outcomes is influenced by several
mediators and moderators.
There are four main mediators of the goal setting – performance relationship: effort,
persistence, direction of attention, and requisite ability (Locke & Latham, 2006). Assuming
adequate ability, greater effort is required to accomplish difficult goals, and exerting more effort
leads to better performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). Setting specific, challenging goals leads to
effort being exerted over a longer period of time, otherwise known as persistence (Bavelas &
Lee, 1978). When people pursue goals, they direct their attention toward accomplishing the
goals, which leads to retrieval of relevant task knowledge (Locke & Latham, 1990). Finally,
goals prompt people to retrieve relevant task knowledge. If relevant task knowledge is
unavailable, such as with a complex, novel task, the person with difficult goals will be motivated
to seek new knowledge.
Key moderators of the goal setting – performance relationship are feedback,
commitment, task complexity, and situational constraints (Locke & Latham, 2006). As the
quality of feedback increases, goal setting will have a stronger positive relationship with
performance. People will be able to more accurately monitor their progress toward
accomplishing their goal. Commitment is required for effective goal setting because otherwise
people would not be invested nor exert attentional resources toward accomplishing the goal. For
complex tasks, it is more difficult to obtain task-relevant information, which means the effect of
goal setting on performance is attenuated. Finally, research has found that situational
constraints, such as completeness of task information, ease of use of materials, and similarity of
the work environment to the training environment weakened the relationship between goal
setting and performance (Peters et al., 1982).
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Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is defined as one’s belief in his ability to accomplish some
task (Bandura, 1977). Bandura (1977) claimed when individuals have a high level of selfefficacy, they are more likely to succeed at a given task. Stajkovic and Luthans (1998) found an
average corrected correlation between self-efficacy and work-related performance of ρ = .38 with
the relationship being moderated both by task complexity and type of study setting.
As mentioned earlier, self-efficacy influences each stage in Bandura’s (1986) Social
Cognitive Theory. Monitoring, judgement, and affective self-reactions are all influenced by selfefficacy, the belief in one’s ability to perform a task or more specifically to execute a particular
behavior successfully (Bandura, 1977). Self-efficacy influences performance through goal
setting. Those with high self-efficacy tend to set higher goals for themselves. Also, the
valuation aspect of the judgement subfunction, how much people value the task they are
performing, is affected by self-efficacy. People show more interest in activities they believe
themselves to be good at (Bandura & Schunk, 1981). Due to its wide applicability within the
self-regulatory process, Bandura (1991) considered self-efficacy to be the most central
mechanism of personal agency.
Bandura (1991) claimed self-efficacy is significant in both discrepancy production and
discrepancy reduction systems. Discrepancy production involves goal setting, in which selfefficacy affects the goal level a person sets for him- or herself. Discrepancy reduction is the
process of working toward a set goal, reducing the perceived discrepancy between current states
and ideal/goal states. To reduce perceived discrepancies, people use self-efficacy to determine
how much effort is needed to achieve their set goal. However, if one’s self-efficacy is inflated,
he might assume the task to be easier than it is and allocate insufficient attentional resources
toward completion of the goal.

27

Allocation of attentional resources. One fundamental assumption of both theories of
self-regulation is that upon detection of a negative discrepancy between current and ideal states,
one will allocate attentional resources toward behaviors that will decrease the discrepancy. In
Control Theory, commitment to a goal is followed by the allocation of attentional resources
toward the goal (Carver & Scheier, 1982). Similarly, in Social Cognitive Theory, Bandura
(1991) described how the exertion of effort or goal relinquishment follows the judgmental
subfunction. Both theories assume attentional resources being allocated to the goal are being
allocated in such a way that one might observe the effect of one’s efforts. This assumption exists
because self-regulation requires the capability to monitor changes in one’s behavior and
performance levels. However, if one’s attentional resources are being directed toward internal
stimuli, which are more difficult to observe, one cannot effectively self-regulate.
The behaviors one engages in response to a perceived discrepancy largely influence how
successful one is at self-regulating. For one to successfully self-regulate, his behavioral response
to the perceived discrepancy must produce an observable consequence, either positive or
negative. That is, one must receive clear feedback about the results of one’s actions if one is to
continually monitor and alter behavior to progress toward a goal. If one does not possess the
requisite ability or knowledge to pursue one’s goals, one might allocate attentional resources
incorrectly, or in a way that does not progress one further toward goal completion. Incorrect
allocation of attentional resources results in several behaviors that do not progress one toward
successful goal accomplishment.
Mind Wandering as a Failure of the Self-regulatory Process
Mind wandering might be considered a behavioral outcome of failed self-regulatory
processes. In both Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1991) and Control Theory (Carver &
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Scheier, 1982), the two major theories of self-regulation, behaviors are defined as a result of a
perceived discrepancy between one’s current and ideal/ought state (Bandura, 1991; Carver &
Scheier, 1982). Those who perceive a positive discrepancy, such that they have already
surpassed their ideal state, might be more likely to mind wander because of a perceived surplus
of attentional resources. However, those who perceive a negative discrepancy, such that their
current state is deficient in comparison to their standards/goals, should be motivated to exert
effort and reduce the perceived discrepancy through exertion of effort and attentional resources.
Thus, mind wandering can be a result of both positive and negative discrepancies.
Both Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1991) and Control Theory (Carver & Scheier,
1982) have described ways in which behaviors such as mind wandering derive from perceived
discrepancies. In Control Theory, Operation is the process through which effort is exerted to
reduce perceived discrepancies between one’s actual state and her standards. Researchers have
described such effort as the “output function”, or the behavioral outcome. Similarly, in Social
Cognitive Theory, Bandura (1991) considered affective self-reactions the final stage in selfregulation immediately preceding a behavioral outcome. In both theories, researchers have
defined behaviors as a result of comparing a current state with an ideal/ought state. As a
behavior, one might consider mind wandering to be the outcome of operation (in Control
Theory) or the affective self-reaction (in Social Cognitive Theory). So, if one perceives his
current state as exceeding his ideal/ought state, he has no affective self-reaction and the
behavioral outcome may be to direct his attention inward toward task-irrelevant stimuli. This
represents intentional mind wandering, wherein one purposefully directs his attentional resources
toward internal stimuli due to a perceived lack of importance of allocating the resources toward
external stimuli. Alternatively, if one perceives his current state to be deficient when compared
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to his ideal/ought state, he should want to exert energy toward reducing the discrepancy.
However, intention does not guarantee effective resource allocation. That is, perhaps some
people have the best intention of reducing the discrepancy but are easily distracted due to
internal stimuli and direct their attentional resources inward. This example represents
unintentional mind wandering, wherein one may find themselves distracted from the current task.
Locke and Latham (2006) considered such misallocation of attentional resources to be a
key mediator in the effect of goal setting on subsequent performance. In the context of selfregulation, goals are unique such that they not only spur motivation (like perceived negative
discrepancies) but also guide one’s attention toward goal-relevant tasks. Goals direct attentional
resources toward goal-relevant tasks and away from goal-irrelevant tasks. Because mind
wandering reflects the shifting of attentional resources toward non-goal-relevant stimuli, mind
wandering might be considered a failure of the goal striving process.
Not only can one consider mind wandering to be an outcome of failed self-regulation or
goal striving, but mind wandering additionally stalls the self-regulatory process such that
progress and evaluative judgments are not possible for the individual until the mind wandering
ceases, emphasizing the importance of understanding antecedents of a behavior with such dire
side-effects. Control Theory’s Operation stage assumes, in response to a perceived discrepancy,
the behavioral outcome results in both (a) appropriate allocation of attentional resources and (b)
an observable impact on the environment. Mind wandering represents a behavior that violates
both assumptions. That is, mind wandering is a misallocation of attentional resources that does
not have a direct impact on the environment. As mentioned earlier, mind wandering requires
meta-awareness to detect and can persist for a long time if it remains undetected. In both Control
theory and Social Cognitive Theory, one’s behavioral outcome from a perceived discrepancy
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must be observable before it can be re-evaluated to determine if the result of the behavior has
reduced the discrepancy at all. Thus, mind wandering can effectively stall the self-regulatory
feedback loop indefinitely, wasting time and attentional resources on goal-irrelevant stimuli. It
is immensely important to understand the predictors of such a dangerous behavioral outcome.
Thus far, research has considered mind wandering a failure of attention, but considering
mind wandering as a consequence of failed self-regulation suggests the examination of unique
antecedents to the literature. There is a plethora of research on self-regulatory antecedents of
goal striving and performance (for a review, see Locke et al., 1981) that might also predict
behavioral indicators of poor goal striving (i.e., mind wandering). Often, researchers have
invoked both affective and motivational mechanisms through which self-regulatory antecedents
influence important outcomes (e.g., Aarts, Custers, Veltkamp, 2008; Bandura, 1977; Seo,
Barrett, & Bartunek, 2004). The mind wandering literature has considered affective predictors
yet ignored motivational predictors. Likely, both predict mind wandering within a larger selfregulatory framework.
A self-regulatory model of mind wandering. One of the most salient research findings
about mind wandering is how frequently people mind wander. Using experience sampling,
Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) estimated people mind wander approximately 50% of the time.
That is, about 50% of the time, people are likely to be thinking about something other than their
immediate, primary task. Moreover, Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010) found evidence that while
people are at work, they are more likely to be mind wandering than those not at work. Thus,
there is substantial need for an expanded model of mind wandering antecedents that might
include self-regulatory mechanisms to explain such frequent occurrences of the behavior. Such a
model is shown as Figure 1.
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Figure 1
The hypothesized model of self-regulatory antecedents of mind wandering.
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Note. Dotted lines represent theorized relationships that will not be tested in the current study.
Extra = Extraversion, Consc = Conscientiousness, PA = Positive Affectivity, GSEFF =
Generalized Self-efficacy, PGO = Prove performance goal orientation, LGO = Learning mastery
goal orientation, Neuro = Neuroticism, NA = Negative Affectivity, AGO = Avoid performance
goal orientation, TAnx = Trait anxiety

The hypothesized model illustrates ways in which environmental, personal, and task
characteristics might predict mind wandering among other important outcomes (i.e.,
performance, state affect). Indeed, self-regulatory theories describe how environment, task, and
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person characteristics interact when predicting behaviors (i.e., reciprocal determinism; Bandura,
1978), and one such behavior is goal striving. Put simply, perceived discrepancies are a product
of the observer (i.e., person characteristics) and the situation (i.e., task, environment
characteristics). So, it is important to remember the role person, task, and environment
characteristics might play when predicting mind wandering. However, the goal of the current
study is to focus on person-level characteristics and how they might influence mind wandering
through goal choice and goal striving processes.
More specifically, for the purposes of the hypothesized model, I will focus on stable
personal characteristics and examine how they might predict mind wandering via self-regulatory
mechanisms. That is, I want to examine preexisting levels of such characteristics and the role
they play when predicting the frequency with which one’s mind wanders. As mentioned
previously, cognitive ability likely predicts mind wandering as the cognitive resources available
to someone predict the way such resources are allocated (i.e., toward task-relevant or taskirrelevant stimuli). However, cognitive ability will not be tested in the current model, as my
focus is to test self-regulatory, as opposed to cognitive, predictors of mind wandering.
Additionally, important outcomes of goal setting such as performance and state affect are beyond
the scope of the current study but should be considered when modelling self-regulatory
mechanisms relating to mind wandering in future research. Indeed, performance and state affect
may be considered outcomes of self-regulation, but they are not the outcomes of interest for the
current study. My aim is to test self-regulatory antecedents of mind wandering.
Hypothesis 1. The hypothesized model shown in Figure 1 will provide acceptable fit.
Next, I will describe each part of the self-regulatory model of mind wandering shown in
Figure 1. I will start with the factors loading onto either approach- or avoidance-based
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temperament latent factors. Next, I will describe the way in which such temperaments influence
the goal level one adopts. Then, I will discuss how goal level interacts with goal commitment
when predicting engagement. Next, I will describe how engagement is related to subsequent
mind wandering. Finally, I will describe several ways in which self-regulatory variables might
have indirect effects on mind wandering.
As mentioned earlier, approach- and avoidance-based orientations are important to
consider when predicting goal level, and such orientations are represented often as latent
temperaments consisting of several manifest variables. Variables used in prior research to reflect
an approach temperament include extraversion, positive affectivity, self-efficacy, proveperformance goal orientation, and learning goal orientation (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Thrash, 2002;
Kandemir, 2014). Variables used in prior research to reflect an avoidance temperament include
neuroticism, negative affectivity, and avoidance goal orientation (Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Thrash,
2002; Kandemir, 2014). Also, trait anxiety is associated closely with an avoidance temperament,
as indicated by several items on Elliot and Thrash’s (2010) measure of avoidance temperament
(e.g., “I feel anxiety and fear very deeply”). Thus, such variables should represent a latent
approach and avoidance temperament.
Hypothesis 2a: Extraversion, conscientiousness, positive affectivity, generalized selfefficacy, prove-performance goal orientation, and learning goal orientation will load onto a
single latent factor.
Hypothesis 2b: Neuroticism, negative affectivity, avoidance-goal orientation, and trait
anxiety will load onto a single latent factor.
Subsequently, such temperament factors influence the goal level one chooses to adopt.
Again, approach and avoidance temperament factors are distinct and consequently have unique
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effects on goal level. Indeed, research has suggested both approach and avoidance factors and
orientations influence the goals one sets for oneself (Heimerdinger & Hinsz, 2008; Payne et al.,
2007). If one is more inclined to approach success, one might be more motivated by the idea of
accomplishing a difficult goal and set higher goals for oneself. However, if one is less motivated
by the idea of accomplishing a difficult goal, one might be content with setting and pursuing a
lower goal level. If one is more inclined to avoid failure, one might set lower goals for oneself to
minimize the possibility of failed goal pursuit. Yet, if one is less inclined to avoid failure, one
might be more willing to set higher goals due to a lesser fear of failure.
Hypothesis 3a: The latent factor of approach-based temperament will be positively
related to goal level.
Hypothesis 3b: The latent factor of avoidance-based temperament will be negatively
related to goal level.
Goal setting theory states a key moderator of goal level’s effect on outcomes is goal
commitment (Locke & Latham, 2006). The success of goal setting is contingent on the amount
of effort and attentional resources allocated to goal-related tasks, which is dually influenced by
the perceived difficulty of the goal as well as how committed one is to the completion of said
goal. If a goal has been assigned to an individual, or if other concerns take priority in his life, he
should be less likely to allocate attentional resources toward its completion. Such a reduction in
one’s allocation of attentional resources toward goal completion often precedes goal
relinquishment, wherein one stops trying and gives up on the goal. Higher levels of goal
commitment increase the likelihood that an individual will continue exerting effort toward
completion of a difficult goal, thus suggesting its moderating role on the relationship between
goal level and engagement.
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Hypothesis 4: Goal level and goal commitment interact when predicting engagement,
such that the positive relationship between goal level and engagement is strengthened with
increasing goal commitment.
Next, motivational factors such as work engagement likely are related to mind
wandering. Work engagement is defined as a positive, affective-motivational state of workrelated well-being (Bakker et al., 2008). Such a state is defined as applying to multiple tasks
which, together, constitute the working environment. Often, theories of engagement have
included facets such as ‘absorption’, a characteristic associated with people who are fully
concentrated on and happily engrossed in their work (Bakker et al., 2008; Rothbard, 2001).
Facets sharing conceptual similarity with attentional control might influence the likelihood and
extent of mind wandering. Indeed, researchers have suggested that increased task engagement
can reduce the frequency of mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). This relationship
might translate to work engagement, such that individuals experiencing greater work-related
well-being should be less likely to mind wander, in part because these individuals have a lower
need to ameliorate states of boredom or exhaustion (as proposed by the ‘relief from boredom’
and ‘dishabituation’ explanations for mind wandering). People who are either disengaged or
unmotivated at work are likely to let their mind wander at a higher frequency than those engaged
and motivated at work.
Hypothesis 5: Engagement will be negatively related to mind wandering.
Finally, several of the self-regulatory variables previously described likely have indirect
effects on mind wandering. For example, if an individual sets a more difficult goal for herself,
she should be more likely to allocate attentional resources to the goal and fewer toward internal
stimuli. As mentioned earlier, both models of self-regulation state that goal-oriented behavior is
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contingent on a perceived discrepancy between current and ideal states (Bandura, 1991; Carver
& Scheier, 1982). The difficulty of one’s goal can be directly mapped onto self-regulatory
theories as the magnitude of one’s discrepancy between a current and ideal state. Both theories
state that the larger the discrepancy, the greater amount of attentional resources which should be
allocated to goal-related tasks. The more attentional resources allocated toward goal-related
tasks indicates higher engagement and leaves fewer in reserve to be allocated toward internal
stimuli (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). That is, when one’s goal performance level is high, one
must be more strongly engaged in the task to facilitate successful goal accomplishment.
Engagement facilitates attentional resource allocation, and without engagement one should be
more likely to allocate attentional resources to non-task related internal stimuli (i.e., to mind
wander). Thus, the difficulty of one’s goal should have an indirect effect on mind wandering
through engagement.
Hypothesis 6: Goal level will have an indirect effect on mind wandering through
engagement.
Another implication of mind wandering applies to personal concerns. Often, researchers
theorized that one’s current concerns might predict mind wandering (Klinger, 1971; Seli et al.,
2016; Smallwood, 2013). Current concerns theory (Klinger, 1971) described how often people
have high-priority secondary tasks that cannot be immediately accomplished and often compete
with the priority of the primary task for attentional resources. Indeed, research has demonstrated
that one’s current concerns (i.e., the importance of some secondary task) are related to the
content within a mind wandering episode (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). However, researchers
have failed to consider primary task importance as an antecedent when predicting mind
wandering frequency. If one is executing a task that he perceives to be highly important, he
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should be less likely to mind wander to secondary tasks. In the context of goal setting, executing
goal-related tasks which one perceives to be highly important is considered a component of one’s
goal commitment (Hollenbeck & Klein, 1987).
If one is highly committed to a goal, she should be more likely to pay attention to the
tasks associated with achieving said goal and less likely to be distracted by task-irrelevant
information. Goal commitment is required for continued goal engagement and subsequent
performance. Indeed, research demonstrates a positive relationship between goal commitment
and performance (ρ = .23, Klein et al., 1999). As mentioned earlier, research has operationalized
mind wandering as performance errors (Mrazek, Franklin, Phillips, Baird, & Schooler, 2013;
Smallwood et al., 2004), so it is likely that goal commitment is related to mind wandering
through its effect on one’s engagement. If one no longer feels committed to her goal, she would
have little reason to remain engaged in allocating attentional resources toward its completion.
Hypothesis 7: Goal commitment will have an indirect effect on mind wandering through
engagement.
If a goal is perceived to be too difficult and one is no longer committed to the goal, one
should be more likely to become disengaged and let their mind wander. Indeed, researchers
suggest goal difficulty interacts with goal commitment when predicting effort and performance
(Erez & Zidon, 1984; Martin & Manning Jr, 1995), and mind wandering is often operationalized
as performance errors (Mrazek et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2004). However, such
performance errors are likely a result of a disengaged mental state. So, goal level and goal
commitment should interact when predicting engagement and subsequent mind wandering.
Hypothesis 8: The interaction between goal level and goal commitment will have an
indirect effect on mind wandering through engagement.
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Method
I proposed two data collection activities for the current study. One was taken from a
student sample whereas the other was taken from a sample of full-time working employees.

I

tested my hypotheses within both samples, inferring that a hypothesis has received stronger
support if the results replicated across samples. Largely, the measures used for each sample
were the same, with a few exceptions described below.
Student Sample
Participants
Participants in the student sample were students in an undergraduate psychology course
at a mid-sized Midwestern university. Participation in this study counted toward students’
overall psychology course grade.
Measures for Demographics and Tests of Predictions
Demographics. I measured demographics in a questionnaire asking participants about
sex, age, year, major, GPA, ethnicity, employment status, and employment type (i.e., full-/parttime; see Appendix A).
Insufficient effort responding. To account for insufficient effort responding, I inserted
the items “Please answer ‘Disagree’ if you are reading these instructions”, “I have never used a
computer”, “I work twenty-eight hours in a typical work day”, and “Please answer ‘Strongly
disagree’ if you are reading these instructions” between various measures in the survey. The
items were inserted before the measures of personality, goal orientation, goal commitment, and
task-specific self-efficacy. All items were rated on a 7-point graphic rating scale from (1)
Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree obtained from Huang and colleagues’ (2015) list of
infrequency items used to detect careless responding.
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Personality. I measured personality using the 50-item measure of the Big Five
personality factors from Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-R IPIP (International Personality
Item Pool, 2013). For the five domains, Costa and McCrae (1992) reported Cronbach’s alphas of
0.86 (Extraversion), 0.86 (Emotional Stability), 0.82 (Openness), 0.77 (Agreeableness), and 0.81
(Conscientiousness). Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale,
ranging from 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate). Sample items included “make friends
easily” (Extraversion), “often feel blue” (Emotional Stability), “have a vivid imagination”
(Openness), “respect others” (Agreeableness), and “am always prepared” (Conscientiousness).
Item responses were averaged to provide an overall score for each factor. Higher scores
indicated higher levels of the corresponding domain of the Big Five. See Appendix B for scale
items.
Affectivity (positive, negative). I measured affectivity using Watson, Clark, and
Tellegen’s (1988) positive and negative affective schedule (PANAS). The PANAS is a 20-item
scale. For each item, participants rate on a 5-point scale the frequency with which they have
experienced the listed emotions in the past few weeks (1, very slightly or not at all; 5, extremely).
The scale is scored by summing the responses to both the positive and negative affective words,
generating distinct scores for both positive and negative affectivity. Higher scores indicate
higher positive or negative affectivity. An example positive affective item is “Enthusiastic”, and
an example negative affective item is “Nervous”. Watson and colleagues (1988) found the
Cronbach’s alpha of both the positive and negative affectivity scales to be .87 See Appendix C
for scale items.
Generalized self-efficacy. I measured generalized self-efficacy using the New
Generalized Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). The NGSE is an 8-item
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scale. For each item, participants rate on a 5-point scale the degree to which they disagree (1,
strongly disagree) or agree (5, strongly agree) with the item. The scale is scored by taking an
average of the item responses. Higher scores indicate higher generalized self-efficacy. An
example generalized self-efficacy item is: “I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have
set for myself.” Chen and colleagues (2001) found the NGSE to have an internal consistency of
α = .86, demonstrating the unidimensionality of the scale, and found the scale to be stable (r =
.67). See Appendix D for scale items.
Goal orientations (learning, prove-performance, avoidance). I measured learning
goal orientation, prove-performance goal orientation, and avoid-performance goal orientation
using a 13-item scale developed by VandeWalle (1997). Responses for each item on the scales
ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). The scale is scored by analyzing the
average of the item responses. A higher score on each scale indicates a higher goal orientation of
that dimension. An example learning goal orientation item is: “I am willing to select a
challenging work assignment that I can learn a lot from.” An example prove-performance goal
orientation item is: “I’m concerned with showing that I can perform better than my coworkers.”
An example avoid-performance goal orientation item is: “I would avoid taking on a new task if
there was a chance I would appear rather incompetent to others.” The internal consistency
reliabilities of the learning, prove, and avoid goal orientation scales were α = .89, α = .85, and α
= .88, respectively (VandeWalle, 1997). The test-retest reliability for each scale studied at two
separate times were r = .66, r = .60, and r = .57. The scale in its current form was specific to the
work environment and was reworded to fit an academic environment for the current study. See
Appendix E for the 13 items. Items were revised to indicate “class” or “student” in place of
“work” and “coworker”.
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Trait anxiety. I measured trait anxiety using the 6-item abbreviated version of
Spielberger’s (1983) State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) scale developed by Marteau and
Bekker (1992). Typically, the STAI measures trait and state anxiety by asking participants to
respond to six items given two separate sets of instructions (one set for trait and one set for
state). I used only the trait anxiety instructions, which ask participants to respond to the items by
indicating how they “generally feel”. Responses were rated on a graphic ratings scale from 1
(Not at All) to 4 (Very Much). I scored the measure by taking the average of item responses.
Marteau and Bekker (1992) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .82 for their abbreviated 6-item scale.
Higher scores on the scale indicate higher levels of trait anxiety. An example item is “I feel
tense”. See Appendix F for scale items.
Goal level. I measured self-set goal level using two questions asking the participant to
state his or her goal for the final exam score and for the final score in the course on a 0-100
percentage scale. See Appendix G for a list of items.
Goal commitment. Commitment to the previous goals was measured using a measure
developed by Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989). The scale consists of four items
with responses ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The four items are
negatively keyed and are reverse-scored to calculate the scale score. The scale score is the
average of the item responses, and higher scores indicate higher commitment to the goal. The
internal consistency reliability for this scale was α = .80 (Hollenbeck et al., 1989). An example
item is: “It’s hard to take this goal seriously.” See Appendix H for a list of items.
Engagement. I measured engagement using Schaufelli and colleagues’ (2002) 17-item
measure. Schaufelli and colleagues (2002) wrote two versions of the measure: one for student
samples and one for work samples. For my student sample, I used the student version. The
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authors did not report the Cronbach’s alpha for the measure, but they did report the Cronbach’s
alpha for each facet within the engagement measure. Internal consistencies ranged from .73 - .84
for the student sample. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale,
ranging from 0 (Never) to 6 (Always) regarding how frequently they experience each item in
relation to a specific courses and in relation to their classes in general. An example item for the
student measure is “I am immersed in my studies”. Items were averaged to provide an overall
score. Higher scores indicate higher engagement with one’s class. See Appendix I for scale
items.
Mind wandering. I measured academic setting mind wandering by adapting the 5-item
Mind Wandering Questionnaire developed by Mrazek, Phillips, Franklin, Broadway, and
Schooler (2013). I altered the instructions to ask about the respondents’ behaviors in their
undergraduate psychology course and in college classes in general. Mrazek and colleagues
(2013) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 for the measure. Participants were asked to rate all
items using a graphic rating scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 6 (Almost always) regarding
how frequently they experience each item in each of the two contexts, e.g., in this class and my
classes in general. An example item is “I have difficulty maintaining my focus on simple or
repetitive work”. Items were averaged to provide an overall score. Higher scores indicate higher
frequency of mind wandering in the academic setting. See Appendix J for scale items.
Measures to Test Alternative Explanations
Task-specific self-efficacy. I measured task-specific self-efficacy using a 10-item
personal efficacy scale developed by Riggs, Warka, Babasa, Betancourt, and Hooker (1994).
Responses are rated on a scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The measure is
scored by taking an average of the item responses. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher
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self-efficacy for the class. The internal consistency reliability for the personal efficacy scale was
found to be α = .86 (Riggs et al., 1994). Items on the scale were reworded to reference tasks
specific to the participants’ introductory psychology class. An example item is “I am a great
student”. See Appendix K for scale items.
Mindfulness. I measured mindfulness using Walach and colleagues’ (2006) 14-item
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI). Walach and colleagues (2006) reported a Cronbach’s
alpha of .86. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale, ranging from
1 (Rarely) to 4 (Almost always). An example item is “I am open to the experience of the present
moment.” Items were averaged to produce an overall score. Higher scores indicate higher levels
of mindfulness. See Appendix L for scale items.
Boredom. I measured boredom using van Hooft and van Hooft’s (2014) 5-item revised
work-related boredom measure, revised from Lee’s (1986) measure to eliminate conflating
boredom with its causes or consequences. Van Hooft and van Hooft (2014) reported a
Cronbach’s alpha of the scale of .91. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic
rating scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 5 (Almost always). For the student sample, I
adapted the measure to reflect their feelings of boredom while in a specific undergraduate
psychology courses and in their classes in general. An example item is “This psychology class
goes by slowly”. Items were averaged to produce an overall score. Higher scores indicate
higher levels of boredom. See Appendix M for scale items.
Metacognition. I measured metacognition using one subsection of the measure
developed by Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004, α = .92). This measure consisted of six items
with responses on a 4-point scale, ranging from Do not agree (1) to Agree very much (4). Scores
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were averaged, and a higher average indicated a higher level of metacognition. An example item
is “I pay close attention to the way my mind works.” See Appendix N for scale items.
Performance. For the student sample, performance was measured in relation to a
specific undergraduate class (using the participants’ percentage score on the final exam and
percentage of the course total points) and in relation to the participant’s classes in general
(cumulative GPA).
Procedure
The surveys were administered online using SONA software partway through the
semester. The survey was administered partway through the semester to allow students enough
experience with the course to develop reasonable impressions of their ability level relative to the
course difficulty and experiences of mind wandering during class. Students logged into their
SONA account and signed up to participate in the study. Participants completed the surveys in
one session at a time and location of their own choosing. In order to avoid missing data,
participants were forced to answer each item to continue to the next page of items. First,
participants completed an informed consent process (see Appendix P). Those individuals
agreeing to participate completed the measures of demographics, personality, affectivity,
generalized self-efficacy, goal orientations, trait anxiety, goal level, goal commitment,
engagement, mind wandering, task-specific self-efficacy, mindfulness, boredom, and
metacognition. Participants completed the surveys in the above order to measure predictor
variables before outcome variables, and all key study variables before measures meant to test
alternative explanations. The exception is the demographics survey which was administered at
the beginning as part of the screener survey. After participants completed the surveys, they were
debriefed (see Appendix Q). Once data collection was completed, professors of the psychology
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class that participants wanted their participation credited to sent me the final exam grades and
final grades of participants. I paired the grades to each participant submission and removed any
identifying information from the dataset.
Work Sample
Participants
Data was collected online from participants recruited from the Mechanical Turk
(MTURK) service provided by Amazon.com, Inc. Participants received a payment of $0.50 for
participating in this study.
Measures for Demographics and Tests of Predictions
Demographics. I measured demographics in a questionnaire asking participants about
sex, age, year, major, GPA, ethnicity, employment status, and employment type (i.e., full-/parttime; see Appendix A).
Insufficient effort responding. To account for insufficient effort responding, I inserted
the items “Please answer ‘Disagree’ if you are reading these instructions”, “I have never used a
computer”, “I work twenty-eight hours in a typical work day”, and “Please answer ‘Strongly
disagree’ if you are reading these instructions” between various measures in the survey. The
items were inserted before the measures of personality, goal orientation, goal commitment, and
task-specific self-efficacy. All items were rated on a 7-point graphic rating scale from (1)
Strongly disagree to (7) Strongly agree obtained from Huang and colleagues’ (2015) list of
infrequency items used to detect careless responding.
Personality. I measured personality using the 50-item measure of the Big Five
personality factors from Costa and McCrae’s (1992) NEO-PI-R IPIP (International Personality
Item Pool, 2013). For the five domains, Costa and McCrae (1992) reported Cronbach’s alphas of
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0.86 (Extraversion), 0.86 (Emotional Stability), 0.82 (Openness), 0.77 (Agreeableness), and 0.81
(Conscientiousness). Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale,
ranging from 1 (Very Inaccurate) to 5 (Very Accurate). Sample items include “make friends
easily” (Extraversion), “often feel blue” (Emotional Stability), “have a vivid imagination”
(Openness), “respect others” (Agreeableness), and “am always prepared” (Conscientiousness).
Item responses were averaged to provide an overall score for each factor. Higher scores indicate
higher levels of the corresponding domain of the Big Five. See Appendix B for scale items.
Affectivity (positive, negative). I measured affectivity using Watson, Clark, and
Tellegen’s (1988) positive and negative affective schedule (PANAS). The PANAS is a 20-item
scale. For each item, participants rate on a 5-point scale the frequency with which they have
experienced the listed emotions in the past few weeks (1, very slightly or not at all; 5, extremely).
The scale is scored by summing the responses to both the positive and negative affective words,
generating distinct scores for both positive and negative affectivity. Higher scores indicate
higher positive or negative affectivity. An example positive affective item is “Enthusiastic”, and
an example negative affective item is “Nervous”. Watson and colleagues (1988) found the
Cronbach’s alpha of both the positive and negative affectivity scales to be .87 See Appendix C
for scale items.
Generalized self-efficacy. I measured generalized self-efficacy using the New
Generalized Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). The NGSE is an 8-item
scale. For each item, participants rate on a 5-point scale the degree to which they disagree (1,
strongly disagree) or agree (5, strongly agree) with the item. The scale is scored by taking an
average of the item responses. Higher scores indicate higher generalized self-efficacy. An
example generalized self-efficacy item is: “I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have
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set for myself.” Chen and colleagues (2001) found the NGSE to have an internal consistency of
α = .86, demonstrating the unidimensionality of the scale, and found the scale to be stable (r =
.67). See Appendix D for scale items.
Goal orientations (learning, performance, avoidance). I measured learning goal
orientation, prove-performance goal orientation, and avoid-performance goal orientation using a
scale developed by VandeWalle (1997). Responses for each item on the scales ranged from
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). The scale is scored by analyzing the average of the
item responses. A higher score on each scale indicates a higher goal orientation of that
dimension. An example learning goal orientation item is: “I am willing to select a challenging
work assignment that I can learn a lot from.” An example prove-performance goal orientation
item is: “I’m concerned with showing that I can perform better than my coworkers.” An
example avoid-performance goal orientation item is: “I would avoid taking on a new task if
there was a chance I would appear rather incompetent to others.” The internal consistency
reliabilities of the learning, prove, and avoid goal orientation scales were α = .89, α = .85, and α
= .88, respectively (VandeWalle, 1997). The test-retest reliability for each scale studied at two
separate times were r = .66, r = .60, and r = .57. See Appendix E for the 13 items.
Trait anxiety. I measured trait anxiety using the 6-item abbreviated version of
Spielberger’s (1983) State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) scale developed by Marteau and
Bekker (1992). Typically, the STAI measures trait and state anxiety by asking participants to
respond to six items given two separate sets of instructions (one set for trait and one set for
state). I used only the trait anxiety instructions, which ask participants to respond to the items by
indicating how they “generally feel”. Responses were rated on a graphic ratings scale from 1
(Not at All) to 4 (Very Much). I scored the measure by taking the average of item responses.
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Marteau and Bekker (1992) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .82 for their abbreviated 6-item scale.
Higher scores on the scale indicate higher levels of trait anxiety. An example item is “I feel
tense”. See Appendix F for scale items.
Goal level. I measured self-set goal level by asking participants to consider their job
performance on a 0-100 scale and state their target performance level as if it were a grade in
school. The item is “Job performance “grade” goal (0-100%): _______”. See Appendix G for
full measure instructions.
Goal commitment. Commitment to the previous goals was measured using a measure
developed by Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989). The scale consists of four items
with responses ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The four items are
negatively keyed and are reverse-scored to calculate the scale score. The scale score is the
average of the item responses, and higher scores indicate higher commitment to the goal. The
internal consistency reliability for this scale was α = .80 (Hollenbeck et al., 1989). An example
item is: “It’s hard to take this goal seriously.” See Appendix H for a list of items.
Engagement. I measured engagement using Schaufelli and colleagues’ (2002) 17-item
measure. Schaufelli and colleagues (2002) wrote two versions of the measure: one for student
samples and one for employee samples. I used the employee version for my work sample. The
authors did not report the Cronbach’s alpha for the measure, but they did report the Cronbach’s
alpha for each facet within the engagement measure. Internal consistencies ranged from .72 - .89
for the work sample. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale,
ranging from 0 (Never) to 6 (Always) regarding how frequently they experience each item. An
example item is “I am immersed in my work”. Items were averaged to provide an overall score.
Higher scores indicate higher engagement with work. See Appendix I for scale items.
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Mind wandering. I measured workplace mind wandering by adapting the 5-item Mind
Wandering Questionnaire developed by Mrazek and colleagues (2013). I altered the instructions
to ask about the respondents’ behaviors in the workplace. Mrazek and colleagues (2013)
reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .85 for the measure. Participants were asked to rate all items
using a graphic rating scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 6 (Almost always) regarding how
frequently they experience each item. An example item is “I have difficulty maintaining my
focus on simple or repetitive work”. Items were averaged to provide an overall score. Higher
scores indicate higher frequency of mind wandering in the workplace. See Appendix J for scale
items.
Measures to Test Alternative Explanations
Task-specific self-efficacy. I measured task-specific self-efficacy using a 10-item
personal efficacy scale developed by Riggs, Warka, Babasa, Betancourt, and Hooker (1994).
Responses are rated on a scale of strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The measure is
scored by taking an average of the item responses. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher
self-efficacy for job-related tasks. The internal consistency reliability for the personal efficacy
scale was found to be α = .86 (Riggs et al., 1994). See Appendix K for scale items. Items on the
scale were reworded to reference generic work-related tasks that might generalize across jobs.
An example item is “I have confidence in my ability to do well at my job.”
Mindfulness. I measured mindfulness using Wallach and colleagues’ (2006) 14-item
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI). Wallach and colleagues (2006) reported a Cronbach’s
alpha of .86. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic rating scale, ranging from
1 (Rarely) to 4 (Almost always). An example item is “I am open to the experience of the present
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moment.” Items were averaged to produce an overall score. Higher scores indicate higher levels
of mindfulness. See Appendix L for scale items.
Boredom. I measured boredom using van Hooft and van Hooft’s (2014) 5-item revised
work-related boredom measure, revised from Lee’s (1986) measure to eliminate conflating
boredom with its causes or consequences. Van Hooft and van Hooft (2014) reported a
Cronbach’s alpha of the scale of .91. Participants were asked to rate all items using a graphic
rating scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 5 (Almost always). An example item is “My job
goes slowly”. Items were averaged to produce an overall score. Higher scores indicate higher
levels of boredom. See Appendix M for scale items.
Metacognition. I measured metacognition using one subsection of the measure
developed by Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004, α = .92). This measure consisted of six items
with responses on a 4-point scale, ranging from Do not agree (1) to Agree very much (4). Scores
were averaged, and a higher average indicated a higher level of metacognition. An example item
is “I pay close attention to the way my mind works.” See Appendix N for scale items.
Performance. For the work sample, I measured performance using the first seven items
of Williams and Anderson’s performance scale (1991). The internal consistency reliability for
this scale was .91 (Williams & Anderson, 1991). Responses range from (1) “strongly disagree”
to (7) “strongly agree.” Responses were averaged. Higher scores on the scale indicate higher
levels of in-role behavior performance. A sample item from the scale is “I adequately complete
assigned duties.” See Appendix O for a complete list of items.
Procedure
The surveys were administered online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk software.
Participants completed the surveys in one session at a time and location of their own choosing.
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In order to avoid missing data, participants were forced to answer each question to continue
participating. First, participants completed a demographics screening survey. Individuals who
were under the age of 18, did not speak English as their primary language, were not United
Citizens and had not resided in the United States for at least ten years, defined their occupation
as either retired, family manager/stay at home parent, unemployed, or other, or had not been
employed in their current position for at least six months were unable to complete the rest of the
survey. Participants who passed the screening survey completed an informed consent process
(see Appendix P). Those individuals agreeing to participate completed the measures of
demographics, personality, affectivity, generalized self-efficacy, goal orientations, trait anxiety,
goal level, goal commitment, engagement, mind wandering, task-specific self-efficacy,
mindfulness, boredom, metacognition, and performance. Participants completed the surveys in
the above order to measure predictor variables before outcome variables, and all key study
variables before measures meant to test alternative explanations. The exception is the
demographics survey which was administered at the beginning as part of the screener survey.
After participants completed the surveys, they were debriefed (see Appendix Q).
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Results
Data cleaning. Of the 168 student sample participants, 32 participants had partial survey
response data removed due to insufficient effort responding. Of the 660 work sample
participants, 584 had partial survey response data removed due to insufficient effort responding.
To retain as much data as possible, if a participant were to trigger an IER item, I only removed
his responses that preceded the triggered IER item. For example, if a participant triggered the
IER item following goal commitment, engagement, and mind wandering, I removed his goal
commitment, engagement, and mind wandering responses. I did this to retain as much data as
possible. As a result of this partial data removal process, I had differing numbers of usable
responses for different measures. I report the number of usable responses for each measure in
the psychometrics properties of measures section below.
I used multiple methods to detect insufficient effort responding, and I checked for
impossible responses, duplicate responses, and outliers. I checked whether participants failed the
insufficient effort responding items. Also, I removed participants whose time spent per item did
not reflect at least 2 seconds being spent attending to each item. If the participant spent an
average of less than 2 seconds per item on a given page, his data were removed. For example, if
there were ten items on a single page and the individual spent less than 20 seconds on the page,
his responses to those ten items were removed. All impossible values were deleted and became
missing values. Further, I checked for duplicate participants finding one instance, so I removed
the data of the second response entirely. I checked for outliers by searching for scores higher or
lower than four standard deviations away from the mean score. Any scores farther than four
standard deviations away from the mean were removed.
Descriptive Statistics
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The mean age in the student sample was 19.46 years with a standard deviation of 2.48
whereas the mean age in the work sample was 38.57 years with a standard deviation of 12.14. In
the student sample, 32.5% were male, 66.9% of participants were female, and .6% identified as
non-binary/third gender. In the work sample, 53.5% were male, 46.3% were female, and .2%
identified as non-binary/third gender. The most common self-reported ethnicity in the student
sample was White/Caucasian (71.2%), followed by African American (13.5%), Asian (6.1%),
Hispanic (4.3%), Other (4.3%), and Native American (.6%). The most common self-reported
ethnicity in the work sample was White/Caucasian (72.3%), followed by African American
(13.3%), Hispanic (5.7%), Native American (4.4%), Asian (3.9%), and Other (.3%). The most
common self-reported completed education level for the student sample was unsurprisingly
Some College (51.5%), followed by High School (44.2%; note: as these participants were all
currently enrolled in a college course, they likely misinterpreted the question. A large
percentage of PSY1010 students are freshmen in college and might not have considered how
they have indeed completed ‘Some College’), College (3.1%), and Graduate School (1.2%). The
most common self-reported completed education level for the work sample was College (62.4%),
followed by Graduate School (20.5%), Some College (11.2%), and High School (5.9%).
I obtained the means, standard deviations, and correlations of key study variables (see
Tables 1 and 2).
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Key Study Variables in the Student Sample
Variable
1. Extra
2. Consc
3. PA
4. GSEFF
5. PGO
6. LGO
7. Neuro
8. NA
9. AGO
10. TAnx
11. Goal
12. GCom
13. Eng
14. MW

M
3.05
3.33
30.86
3.88
3.14
4.15
2.87
20.99
3.27
2.11
82.72
3.98
3.84
3.93

SD
.72
.65
8.62
.68
1.19
1.03
.83
8.26
1.12
.68
20.30
.72
.99
1.04

1
.31**
.38**
.37**
.16
.29**
-.27**
-.01
-.18*
-.20*
.06
.19*
.15
-.06

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.38**
.57**
.02
.40**
-.60**
-.41**
-.33**
-.43**
.11
.38**
.39**
-.30**

.33**
.09
.39**
-.23
-.05
-.24**
-.34**
.12
.17*
.48**
-.30**

.17*
.56**
-.46**
-.34**
-.41**
-.44**
.02
.47**
.40**
-.27**

.14
.12
.09
.16*
-.00
.04
-.10
.05
.07

-.27**
-.18*
-.42**
-.28**
.03
.29**
.54**
-.31*

.52**
.33**
.53**
-.12
-.32**
-.34**
.42**

.29**
.69**
-.20*
-.37**
-.24**
.35**

.34**
-.03
-.27**
-.29**
.32**

-.16
-.27**
-.33**
-.10

-.01
.08
-.10

.37**
-.24**

-.39**

-

Note. Extra = Extraversion, Consc = Conscientiousness, PA = Positive Affectivity, GSEFF = Generalized Self-efficacy, PGO = Prove
performance goal orientation, LGO = Learning mastery goal orientation, Neuro = Neuroticism, NA = Negative Affectivity, AGO =
Avoid performance goal orientation, TAnx = Trait anxiety, Goal = Goal level, GCom = Goal Commitment, Eng = Engagement, MW
= Mind Wandering; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01.
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Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Key Study Variables in the Work Sample
Variable
1. Extra
2. Consc
3. PA
4. GSEFF
5. PGO
6. LGO
7. Neuro
8. NA
9. AGO
10. TAnx
11. Goal
12. GCom
13. Eng
14. MW

M
3.23
3.69
37.77
4.08
4.06
4.69
2.40
19.43
3.22
1.88
82.26
2.97
5.02
3.36

SD
.66
.55
7.14
.62
1.12
.93
.74
8.00
1.32
.64
17.74
1.17
.99
1.36

1
.25**
.52**
.42**
.20*
.40**
-.41**
-.19*
-.30**
-.32**
.11
.17*
.35**
-.17

2

3

4

5

.38**
.62**
.06
.48**
-.60**
-.57**
-.39**
-.51**
.35**
.60**
.31**
-.54**

.54**
.32**
.52**
-.38**
-.21**
-.05
-.48**
.16
.13
.67**
-.16*

.18*
.66**
-.51**
-.49**
-.35**
-.55**
.37**
.47**
.38**
-.32**

.35**
.04
.04
.32**
-.01
-.03
-.14
.27**
.02

6

-.45**
-.40**
-.28**
-.42**
.35**
.42**
.52**
-.29**

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.55**
.49**
.61**
-.29**
-.49**
-.23**
.52**

.41**
.72**
.48**
-.68**
-.20*
.62**

.35**
-.27**
-.48**
-.07
.27**

-.33**
-.49**
-.32**
.44**

.33**
.14
-.32**

.08
-.75**

-.15*

-

Note. Extra = Extraversion, Consc = Conscientiousness, PA = Positive Affectivity, GSEFF = Generalized Self-efficacy, PGO = Prove
performance goal orientation, LGO = Learning mastery goal orientation, Neuro = Neuroticism, NA = Negative Affectivity, AGO =
Avoid performance goal orientation, TAnx = Trait anxiety, Goal = Goal level, GCom = Goal Commitment, Eng = Engagement, MW
= Mind Wandering; * = p < .05, ** = p < .01.
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Psychometric Properties of Measures
I tested internal consistency reliabilities for all measures used in both the student and
work samples. Note that I reported the number of usable responses for each measure where I
reported the observed reliabilities. The personality measures from the NEO-PI-R IPIP (Costa &
McCrae, 1992) showed similar internal consistency estimates in both student and work samples,
respectively (Neuroticism: .88, .78, 155 usable student responses, 237 usable work responses;
Extraversion: .83, .72, 155 usable student responses, 237 usable work responses; Openness: .73,
.75, 155 usable student responses, 237 usable work responses; Agreeableness: .77, .80, 155
usable student responses, 237 usable work responses; Conscientiousness: .88, .82, 155 usable
student responses, 237 usable work responses). Positive affectivity from the PANAS (Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) had an internal consistency reliability of .90 in the student sample and
.89 in the work sample (155 usable student responses, 173 usable work responses). Negative
affectivity from the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) had an internal consistency
reliability of .89 in the student sample and .94 in the work sample (155 usable student responses,
173 usable work responses). The New Generalized Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scale (Chen, Gully, &
Eden, 2001) had an internal consistency reliability of .89 in the student sample and .87 in the
work sample (161 usable student responses, 298 usable work responses). The goal orientation
scale (VandeWalle, 1997) demonstrated similar internal consistency reliabilities in both student
and work samples, respectively, for learning goal orientation (.89, .86, 153 usable student
responses, 253 usable work responses), prove performance goal orientation (.83, .80, 153 usable
student responses, 253 usable work responses), and avoid goal orientation (.82, .86, 153 usable
student responses, 253 usable work responses). The internal consistency reliability for trait
anxiety (Marteau & Bekker, 1992) was .86 for the student sample and .81 for the work sample
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(155 usable student responses, 232 usable work responses). The internal consistency reliability
for goal commitment (Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, & Wright, 1989) was .69 in the student
sample and .88 in the work sample (156 usable student responses, 595 usable work responses).
The internal consistency reliability for engagement (Schaufelli et al., 2002) was .90 for the
student sample and .94 for the work sample (151 usable student responses, 210 usable work
responses). The internal consistency for mind wandering (Mrazek et al., 2013) was .87 for the
student sample and .91 for the work sample (156 usable student responses, 447 usable work
responses). The internal consistency reliability for task-specific self-efficacy (Riggs, Warka,
Babasa, Betancourt, & Hooker, 1994) was .73 for the student sample and .69 for the work
sample (162 usable student responses, 275 usable work responses). The internal consistency for
mindfulness (Wallach et al., 2006) was .81 for the student sample and .82 for the work sample
(157 usable student responses, 278 usable work responses). The internal consistency reliability
for boredom (van Hooft & van Hooft, 2014) was .90 for the student sample and .93 for the work
sample (159 usable student responses, 268 usable work responses). The internal consistency for
metacognition (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) was .86 for the student sample and .81 for the
work sample (154 usable student responses, 251 usable work responses). The internal
consistency reliability for self-reported performance (Williams & Anderson, 1991) was .73 for
the work sample (245 usable work responses).
Hypothesis Testing
I completed tests of hypotheses within each sample, considering the hypothesis as having
stronger support if the results replicated across samples. The following hypotheses were tested
simultaneously within a single hypothesized structural equation model. Assuming adequate fit,
various path coefficients within the model provided tests of Hypotheses 2-8. If the model did not
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provide adequate fit, the path coefficients would be considered uninterpretable (Kenny, 2020;
Kline, 2005).
Structural equation model hypothesis. Hypothesis 1 stated that the hypothesized
model shown in Figure 1 would provide adequate fit. I used four recommended measures of
model fit and their respective recommended cutoff levels (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005):
chi-square, Bentler comparative fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation
(RMSEA), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). I used the following criteria for
each measure of model fit: a non-significant 2, a CFI greater than or equal to .90, an RMSEA
less than or equal to .06, and an SRMR less than or equal to .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). However,
both 2 and RMSEA are affected by large sample sizes (Rose et al., 2017), so I considered either
an acceptable RMSEA or SRMR in addition to an acceptable CFI evidence of appropriate model
fit. Additionally, I used bootstrapping with 1000 replacements to evaluate indirect effects
(Shrout and Bolger, 2002). Bootstrapping provides more accurate parameter estimates by
resampling with replacement numerous times (Kenny, 2020; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout &
Bolger, 2002). Bootstrapping is recommended for small sample sizes (Shrout & Bolger, 2002)
and is a powerful test of indirect effects because it is less conservative and provides unbiased
estimates in non-normal sampling distributions (Kenny, 2020; Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout
& Bolger, 2002). For the hypothesized model in the student sample, the chi-square statistic was
significant, 2(87) = 734.84, p < .001, the CFI statistic was .37, the RMSEA was .23, and the
SRMR was .20. For the hypothesized model in the work sample, the chi-square statistic was
significant 2(87) = 465.76, p < .001, the CFI statistic was .44, the RMSEA was .24, and the
SRMR was .28. Thus, the hypothesized model did not provide acceptable fit in either student or
work samples (see Figures 2 and 3). So, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Because Hypotheses
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2-8 assumed an acceptably fitting model, the rest of my hypotheses were untestable, as originally
conceived. However, I tested several alternative models to assess the hypothesized relationships
in the context of alternative models.
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Figure 2
Results for the Hypothesized Model in the Student Sample

Extra

Consc
1.56* (.74)
PA
12.96* (4.38)
GSEFF

Approach

1.64* (.63)
Goal commitment

4.40 (8.47)
PGO

.33 (.47)

.45 (.78)

.00 (.01)

1.98* (.76)

Goal level

LGO

Engagement

Mind wandering
-.36* (.09)

-4.30 (4.29)

Neuro

-.00 (.04)
NA
10.25* (2.10)
AGO

TAnx

Avoid

.93* (.20)
.92* (.17)

Note. Dotted paths reflect direct effects that were included with the displayed interaction. Unstandardized
beta coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses). * p < .05.
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Figure 3
Results for the Hypothesized Model in the Work Sample

Extra

Consc
1.07 (.55)
PA
11.29* (2.78)
GSEFF

Approach
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Goal commitment
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-.05 (*.04)

NA
6.86* (1.80)
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.83* (.26)
.67* (.16)
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Avoid

Note. Dotted paths reflect direct effects that were included with the displayed interaction. Unstandardized
beta coefficients and standard errors. * p < .05.
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Testing Alternative Models
Structural equation modeling hypothesis. First, I examined the descriptive statistics of
the key study variables. Contrary to my prediction, prove-performance goal orientation was not
correlated with the other approach-motivation temperament variables. However, this is
consistent with some prior research that showed prove-performance goal orientation effects can
be embedded in more complex relationships (e.g., involving self-assessed competence and group
identification dynamics) in their effects on outcomes (e.g., Dietz et al., 2015). Next, I noticed
that goal level was not related to the other key study variables such as goal commitment,
engagement, or mind wandering, which was inconsistent with my hypothesized model. Further,
modification indices strongly suggested several paths connecting negative affectivity with other
variables in the model in such a way that would substantially complicate the model and reduce
its parsimony.
These observations led me to reexamine relationships between manifest and latent
approach and avoid variables as well as to re-conceptualize the structural equation model. First,
I focused my attention on relationships between the manifest and latent approach and avoid
variables. Specifically, I conducted a 2-factor CFA on these variables (using maximum
likelihood estimation), examining the factor loadings of the dispositional manifest variables
(excluding prove-performance goal orientation and negative affectivity) on their respective latent
factors (student sample: 2(19) = 50.27, p < .05, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .11, SRMR = .06; work
sample: 2(19) = 45.62, p < .05, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .13, SRMR = .07; see Table 3). Results
indicated all variables had loadings with absolute values greater than .4. The 2-factor model
provided adequate model fit. For comprehensiveness, I also conducted a 1-factor CFA (using
maximum likelihood estimation). Results indicated that all variables had loadings with absolute
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values greater than .4 (student sample: 2(20) = 57.59, p < .05, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .12, SRMR
= .06; work sample: 2(20) = 45.74, p < .05, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .12, SRMR = .07; see Table
3). Thus, a 1-factor model also provided adequate model fit.
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Table 3
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (2- and 1-factor) Loadings of Dispositional Variables in Student
and Work Samples
Student Sample
Factor 1 Factor 2

Work Sample
Factor 1
Factor 2

2-factor solution
Extra
Consc
GSEFF
PA
LGO
Neuro
AGO
TAnx

.47
.76
.79
.50
.61

Extra
Consc
GSEFF
PA
LGO
Neuro
AGO
TAnx

.46
.76
.77
.49
.59
-.67
-.51
-.59

.74
.52
.67

Extra
Consc
GSEFF
PA
LGO
Neuro
AGO
TAnx

.57
.76
.82
.63
.71

Extra
Consc
GSEFF
PA
LGO
Neuro
AGO
TAnx

.58
.76
.82
.64
.71
-.84
-.43
-.69

.83
.42
.69

1-factor solution

Note. Extra = Extraversion, Consc = Conscientiousness, PA = Positive Affectivity, GSEFF =
Generalized Self-efficacy, PGO = Prove performance goal orientation, LGO = Learning mastery
goal orientation, Neuro = Neuroticism, AGO = Avoid performance goal orientation, TAnx =
Trait anxiety. Loadings were estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
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Next, I proposed an alternative model in which I first eliminated goal level and then
proposed paths from approach and avoid (either 1- or 2-factor CFA solutions) both to goal
commitment and engagement and from both goal commitment and engagement to mind
wandering. As mentioned above, goal level showed weak relationships with other model
variables whereas goal commitment showed more consistent relationships. Given the adequate
fit of both a 2- and 1-factor CFA, I tested first an alternative structural model in which the
manifest dispositional variables (excluding prove-performance goal orientation and negative
affectivity) loaded on two latent factors (i.e., approach and avoid), both of which predicted both
goal commitment and engagement, which both then predicted mind wandering. The model did
not provide acceptable fit (student sample: 2(40) = 116.30, p < .05, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .12,
SRMR = .09; work sample: 2(40) = 104.21, p < .05, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .14, SRMR = .08; see
Figures 4 and 5). Then, I tested a similar model with the manifest dispositional variables
(excluding prove-performance goal orientation and negative affectivity) loading on one latent
factor, which predicted both goal commitment and engagement, which both predicted mind
wandering. The model did not provide acceptable fit (student sample: 2(43) = 124.33, p < .05,
CFI = .83, RMSEA = .12, SRMR = .09; work sample: 2(43) = 112.50, p < .05, CFI = .83,
RMSEA = .14, SRMR = .09; see Figures 6 and 7). I examined the modification indices of both
the poorly fitting 1- and 2-factor SEM models previously described, but I did not observe any
modification indices that provided theoretically defensible model revisions.
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Figure 4
Results for an Alternative Model with Two Latent Factors in the Student Sample
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Note. Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors. * p < .05.
67

Figure 5
Results for an Alternative Model with Two Latent Factors in the Work Sample
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Figure 6
Results for an Alternative Model with One Latent Factor in the Student Sample
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Note. Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors. * p < .05
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Figure 7
Results for an Alternative Model with One Latent Factor in the Work Sample
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Next, given the lack of fit of the hypothesized model and the 1-factor and 2-factor
alternative structural models, I conducted additional exploratory analyses. Specifically, in the
interest of parsimony, I used a one latent factor model because the previously mentioned CFAs
provided evidence that approach and avoidance temperaments might reflect a singular construct
(i.e., the absolute value of all factor loadings from approach and avoidance variables on the
single factor were greater than .4), and I used dispositional variables I believed to most strongly
represent the construct of a single approach-avoid motivational temperament instead of the
longer list of eight dispositional variables. So, I tested a model in which learning goal
orientation and avoidance goal orientation loaded onto a single approach-avoid latent factor,
which then predicted both goal commitment and engagement, which both then predicted mind
wandering. As mentioned above, I opted to use only goal commitment in the model because of
the weaker relationships observed for goal level with other variables. This exploratory model
provided acceptable fit (student sample: 2(4) = 14.37, p < .05, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .13, SRMR
= .06; work sample: 2(4) = 14.27, p < .05, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .14, SRMR = .07; see Figures 8
and 9), and the modification indices did not suggest any new paths should be added to the model.
Thus, I used the model to examine relationships related to Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 5. I used path
coefficients I obtained from this exploratory model to examine these relationships, with
modifications as required. Hypotheses 4, 6, 7, and 8 were untestable in the exploratory structural
model displayed in Figures 8 and 9.
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Figure 8
Results for an Alternative Model with Two Manifest Variables and One Latent Factor in the Student Sample
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Note. Unstandardized beta coefficients and standard errors. * p < .05.
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Figure 9
Results for an Alternative Model with Two Manifest Variables and One Latent Factor in the Work Sample
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Factor loading hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a stated that extraversion, conscientiousness,
positive affectivity, generalized self-efficacy, prove-performance goal orientation, and learning
goal orientation would load onto a single latent factor representing an approach-motivational
temperament. Hypothesis 2b stated that neuroticism, negative affectivity, avoidance-goal
orientation, and trait anxiety would load onto a single latent factor representing an avoidancemotivational temperament. However, as described above, our hypothesized model that included
all the manifest variables previously listed did not provide acceptable fit. Instead, I conducted
exploratory analyses to examine relationships similar to those proposed in Hypothesis 2a and 2b.
Specifically, I examined path coefficients from learning and avoid goal orientations to a single
latent factor representing approach-motivational temperaments (see Figures 8 and 9). Because I
used learning goal orientation as the indicator variable for the factor, the analysis produced a
path coefficient for only the avoid goal orientation path. The path from avoid goal orientation to
the latent factor was negative and statistically significant in both the student sample (b = -.72, SE
= .13, p < .01) and the work sample (b = -.61, SE = .28, p < .05). So, both learning goal
orientation and avoid goal orientation loaded onto a single approach motivational temperament
factor. Thus, the relationship examined in the replacement analysis for Hypothesis 2 was
supported.
Main effect hypotheses. Hypotheses 3a and 3b stated direct effects between approachmotivational and avoid-motivational temperaments, respectively, and goal level. However,
neither goal level nor avoidance-motivational temperament were included in our alternative
structural model and goal level was more weakly related to other variables relative to goal
commitment, so instead I conducted exploratory analyses to examine relationships similar to
those proposed in Hypothesis 3a and 3b. Specifically, I examined whether approach-
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motivational temperament was positively related to goal commitment. The path coefficient was
positive and statistically significant in both the student sample (b = .40, SE = .13, p < .01) and
the work sample (b = .58, SE = .23, p < .05). Thus, the relationship examined in the replacement
analysis for Hypothesis 3 was supported.
Hypothesis 5 stated that engagement would be negatively related to mind wandering. To
test Hypothesis 5, I examined the sign and significance level of the path coefficient from
engagement to mind wandering in the alternative model displayed in Figures 8 and 9. The path
coefficient was negative and statistically significant in both the student (b = -.34, SE = .09, p <
.01) and the work sample (b = -.26, SE = .11, p < .05). Thus, the revised version of Hypothesis 5
was supported.
Interaction hypothesis. Hypothesis 4 stated that goal level and goal commitment will
interact when predicting engagement, such that high goal commitment will strengthen the
positive relationship between goal level and engagement within the hypothesized model.
Because the hypothesized model did not provide acceptable fit, Hypothesis 4 was not testable.
Indirect effect hypotheses. Hypotheses 6-8 described indirect paths through which
more distal influences affect outcomes through proximal influences. Hypothesis 6 stated that
goal level would have an indirect effect on mind wandering through engagement. Hypothesis 7
stated that goal commitment would have an indirect effect on mind wandering through
engagement. Hypothesis 8 stated that the interaction between goal level and goal commitment
would have an indirect effect on mind wandering through engagement. Because the revised
model did not include the hypothesized indirect paths, Hypotheses 6-8 were not testable.
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Discussion
Overview
The purpose of the current study was to create and test a self-regulatory model of mind
wandering. Through exploratory model testing, I found consistent results between both student
and work samples such that an exploratory self-regulatory model of mind wandering provided
acceptable fit whereas the hypothesized model did not. I found evidence for both a 1- and 2factor solution when loading manifest variables onto either distinct approach and avoidance
motivational temperaments or a combined, single, approach-avoid motivational temperament.
Further, the single approach-avoid motivational temperament was positively related to goal
commitment in both student and work samples. Engagement was negatively related to mind
wandering in both samples. These results contributed to the literature by providing evidence that
motivational mechanisms significantly predict mind wandering in both student and work
contexts and raise issues relating to 1) the uni- versus multi-dimensionality of approach and
avoid-motivational temperaments, 2) distinctions between goal level, goal commitment, and
other motivational variables, and 3) the need to integrate motivational mechanisms and
predictors into existing models of mind wandering.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Dimensionality of approach and avoid-motivational temperaments. This study
provided empirical evidence that latent motivational temperaments might not function as
distinctly as previously thought. Prior research has suggested the existence of dispositions that
distinctly influence the goals one chooses for oneself (Elliot, 1999). However, I discovered a
well-fitting, single-factor model wherein all approach and avoid-motivational manifest variables
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provided acceptable factor loadings. Such a finding raises issues relating to the discriminant
validity of the two latent factors. Indeed, if the latent factors were distinct, a single-factor
solution should not provide acceptable fit with such high factor loadings across all manifest
variables. Perhaps approach and avoid-motivational temperaments might be more appropriately
conceptualized as opposing ends along a single continuum. Such a unidimensional continuum
might be defined as one’s tendency to be motivated by consequences of goal-directed behavior
(i.e., mastery of the subject/task, the absence of negative consequences). Perhaps individuals are
more or less motivated by the consequences of goal directed behavior and that such a difference
in disposition might lead to distinct behavioral outcomes. Such a conceptualization might reflect
affective characteristics in individuals, such that some might be more excitable by perceived
behavioral outcomes than others. Future research might investigate this unidimensional factor
and test if affective variables (in addition to trait anxiety) similarly load onto the single factor
along with goal orientations and other motivational variables. Doing so might inform subsequent
research on motivational temperaments to better test the dimensionality of the latent factors.
Indeed, if individuals fail to distinguish between approach and avoidance temperaments, perhaps
practitioners do not need to consider distinct goal orientations when training people how to
complete tasks. Rather, trainers might consider simply assessing a single construct of
motivational temperament.
Alternatively, perhaps the single-factor solution represents the methodological limitations
associated with the measures used to assess distinct temperaments. Prior research has suggested
conceptual distinctions between approach and avoidance-motivation temperaments such that
approach variables reflect one’s sensitivity to goal accomplishment whereas avoidancemotivation reflects one’s sensitivity to goal failure (Elliot, 1999). Although the distinction
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between the two motivational temperaments is proposed by theory, items might not be created
well enough to elicit distinct responses in participants. Thus, practitioners should consider
distributing the items associated with the distinct motivational temperaments throughout surveys
instead of close in proximity to each other. Doing so would reduce the likelihood of participants
responding to approach and avoid-motivation temperament items similarly due only to the
temporal proximity. Future research might investigate how methodological limitations
associated with self-response measures (i.e., common method bias and temporal proximity of
items) might demonstrate unidimensionality between other conceptually similar, yet distinct,
constructs.
Unrelatedness of goal level to other motivational variables. The hypothesized model
for the current study described motivational mechanisms that might predict mind wandering,
focusing primarily on goal setting theory with goal level as a central component. However, goal
level was unrelated to nearly all other motivational variables in both the student and work sample
whereas goal commitment showed the significant relationships I expected. Such a discrepancy
highlights the conceptual and methodological distinction between measures of self-set goal level
and goal commitment. I assessed self-set goal level using a single-item measure (i.e., “Goal for
total points in class (% of total points): _____”) meant to capture one’s target performance level
for either her course or her work environment (depending on the sample). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, nearly all participants set high goals for themselves such that observations for
goal level were not normally distributed (student sample skew = -3.34, student sample kurtosis =
11.34; work sample skew = -2.18, work sample kurtosis = 6.03). However, I assessed goal
commitment to capture how committed one is to her self-set goal using a four-item measure and
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observed a more normal distribution of responses compared to goal level (student sample skew =
-.47, student sample kurtosis = -.12; work sample skew = .37, work sample kurtosis = -1.11).
There are many reasons for participants to skew their self-set goal levels. Participants
might be setting high goal levels as a target goal or as defense or self-presentation mechanism,
demonstrating to themselves or others their high aspirations. Also, participants from both the
student and work samples have a vested interest in producing high levels of performance.
Setting goals is a motivational behavior one engages in to activate effortful behaviors to
accomplish the goal. Likely, setting a low goal would result in fewer resources allocated toward
such effortful behaviors, which participants might expect to result in poorer performance.
Further, such poor performance that might result from setting low goals for oneself might lead to
a perception of sunk costs such that one might perceive she had lost time, money, and effort that
might not be regained. Such a finding highlights the need for goal setting research to carefully
monitor the distribution of responses when participants are setting goals for themselves to ensure
assumptions of normality are met when testing complex models.
In addition to the methodological implications of non-normally distributed goal level, my
results might reflect differences in studying goal level as a between- versus a within-subject
variable. That is, the current study used a between-subjects design. All data were collected at
one point in time, and I examined goal level effects across participants. Perhaps, goal setting
mechanisms would be more appropriately examined within-subject and longitudinally. A
within-subjects design would allow the researcher to examine how changes in an individual’s
goal levels affect important outcomes. Although much research has demonstrated that goal
effects are robust, large enough to detect across different people, other research has suggested
that goal levels should be examined as a within-subject variable (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2013).
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Motivational predictors of attentional behaviors. My study demonstrated significant
relationships between motivational predictors and attentional behavior outcomes (i.e., mind
wandering). Prior models of mind wandering have failed to address the influence of
motivational effects on the extent to which one allocates attentional resources to her primary
task. The exploratory models described in this study provided evidence that both goal
commitment and engagement are significantly related to the frequency with which one’s mind
wanders. Goal commitment is defined as a motivational construct whereas work engagement is
defined as an affective-motivational attitude (Bakker et al., 2008; Locke & Latham, 1990).
Further, exploratory analyses revealed significant indirect effects of approach-avoid
motivational temperament on mind wandering through engagement in the student sample and
through both engagement and goal commitment in the work sample. This finding suggests that
one’s motivational temperament affects mind wandering tendencies through multiple
mechanisms. Such a distinction suggests engagement and goal commitment function differently
as mechanisms through which motivational factors might influence mind wandering. Goal
commitment is associated with motivational content whereas engagement is an attitude that
consists of motivational, affective, and attentional components (i.e., dedication, vigor,
absorption; Bakker et al., 2008). Further, goal commitment directly relates to goal setting
processes and is required to engage goal striving behavior whereas engagement is less associated
with goal setting processes and is more representative of a general attitude toward a task or
working environment. Also, other attitudes might serve as mechanisms through which
motivational antecedents predict outcomes via affective, cognitive, or behavioral intention (e.g.,
motivation) components.
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Moreover, the results from this study suggest a conceptual distinction between goal
commitment, a variable central to goal setting processes, and engagement, a more general
attitude toward the school or work environment. Given that attitudes have motivational as well
as affective and behavioral (intentional) components, one might have assumed that goal
commitment would not account for unique variance in mind wandering. Possibly, the
motivational aspect of engagement was less influential in the presence of the affective and
behavioral components, thus not being redundant with the effects of goal commitment.
Alternatively, perhaps the motivational aspect of engagement reflected more arousal or effort
whereas goal commitment reflected more direction-based aspects of motivation, which would
explain the unique variance accounted for by engagement and goal commitment in effects on
mind wandering. Future research should assess the incremental variance in attentional outcomes
accounted for by engagement attitudes beyond that accounted for by goal-related variables (i.e.,
goal commitment). Further, future research should consider such unique effects across multiple
environments.
Although many implications of this study are theoretical, there are several practical
implications. First, in jobs that require high attentional demand, practitioners should consider the
role of motivational processes such as the trainee’s motivational temperament, commitment to
self-set goals, and engagement with the task itself. If trainees are not motivated properly, they
might be more likely to experience attentional lapses, resulting in errors or even critical
incidents. Second, motivational temperament variables such as avoidance goal orientation might
be more sensitive to the type of job a trainee typically performs and should be accounted for
when predicting the trainee’s tendency to mind wander. That is, perhaps a job in which
attentional lapses can have severe consequences (e.g., air traffic controller) produces workers
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more motivated by a fear of failure and less likely to mind wander through motivational
processes. Such job characteristics likely influence motivational antecedents to mind wandering.

Limitations
There were several limitations in the current study that should be addressed. First, all
data was collected during the COVID-19 pandemic, which might limit the generalizability of
these findings to samples not currently studying/working during a pandemic. The nature of work
substantially shifted toward virtual environments, which might have produced observations of
motivational and attentional variables that are not representative of a non-pandemic
student/worker. Second, self-reported measures of mind wandering only report the frequency,
not duration, of the behavior. That is, perhaps the length of one’s mind wandering episode might
be predicted by motivational factors such that one that is highly motivated might be more likely
to engage self-monitoring behaviors to catch mind wandering. Third, all measures used in the
models tested for the current study were self-report, which could lead to common method bias in
the results. Perhaps the shared variance between predictors of mind wandering is simply due to
the nature of the metric used to capture such predictors. However, given the unrelatedness of
many variables, I expect common method bias did not substantially influence my results.
Fourth, our work sample consisted of workers using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform,
wherein automated response ‘bots’ frequently respond to surveys posted and can even pass
insufficient effort responding checks (e.g., Kennedy et al., 2020). However, we screened for
careless responding using infrequency items to reduce the likelihood of obtaining non-human
response data.
Future Research
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Although I addressed some future research suggestions above, here I discuss more
general suggestions for future research. First, the results from the current study provided
evidence that there is a need to consider motivational processes and mechanisms in models of
mind wandering. That is, perhaps future models of mind wandering antecedents should consider
more than just the motivational variables assessed in the current study and expand to include
additional well-established motivational variables (e.g., task-specific self-efficacy). Second,
researchers should consider a more rigorous examination of the dimensionality of approach and
avoidance motivational temperaments, including more variables that might be characteristic of
approach and/or avoidance motivational temperaments. Such a synthesis of the two
temperaments might lead to new conceptualizations of a single-factor goal orientation variable
reflecting one’s tendency to be motivated by outcomes of goal-directed behavior (i.e., mastery of
the subject/task, the absence of negative consequences). Third, researchers should continue to
test self-regulatory models of mind wandering using behavioral measures and/or neuroimaging
that might capture both the frequency and duration of mind wandering episodes. Fourth,
researchers should examine self-regulatory models of mind wandering at the within-person level
of analysis using malleable self-regulatory variables. Further, at the within-person level of
analysis, researchers might consider examining the stability of one’s mind wandering frequency
longitudinally. That is, perhaps one’s mind wandering frequency changes over time or might be
associated with changes in other malleable self-regulatory variables (e.g., task-specific selfefficacy).
Conclusions
The current study contributes to the existing literature by investigating how motivational
processes predict one’s tendency to mind wander. Through exploratory model testing, I
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produced a structural equations model that provided acceptable fit modelling motivational
processes as antecedents to the frequency with which one’s mind wanders. Future research
should investigate the nature of motivational antecedents of mind wandering and test alternative
motivational theories to provide converging or diverging evidence of the role of motivation when
predicting mind wandering. Trainers should consider motivational factors such as goal
commitment and engagement when examining how likely a trainee is to mind wander. Overall,
my results demonstrated that motivational processes significantly affect one’s tendency to mind
wander, providing further evidence of the need to integrate motivational and attentional
literatures.
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Appendix A
Demographics
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please select the response that best reflects your answer.
Age (in years):
Gender (select one): Male Female

Non-binary

Ethnicity (select one): African American
Pacific Islander

Asian

Hispanic

White/Caucasian

Completed education level (select one):

Native American

Other: _____

High School

Some College

College

Graduate School

College GPA (if applicable):

Current employment status (select one): Full-time Part-time

Unemployed

Total Number of Years Working (if applicable):

Number of Years Working in Current Employment (if applicable):

Job Title (if applicable):
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Appendix B
Personality
(Both Student and Work Samples)

INSTRUCTIONS: Below are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale
below to describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you
generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future.

1

2

Very
Inaccurate

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

3

4

5

Moderately

Neither Accurate

Moderately

Very

Inaccurate

nor Inaccurate

Accurate

Accurate

Often feel blue. (N)
Feel comfortable around people. (E)
Believe in the importance of art. (O)
Have a good word for everyone. (A)
Am always prepared. (C)
Rarely get irritated. (N)*
Have little to say. (E)*
Am not interested in abstract ideas. (O)*
Have a sharp tongue. (A)*
Waste my time. (C)*
Dislike myself. (N)
Make friends easily. (E)
Have a vivid imagination (O)
Believe that others have good intentions. (A)
Pay attention to details. (C)
Seldom feel blue. (N)*
Keep in the background. (E)*
Do not like art. (O)*
Cut others to pieces. (A)*
Find it difficult to get down to work. (C)*
Am often down in the dumps. (N)
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22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Am skilled in handling social situations. (E)
Tend to vote for liberal political candidates. (O)
Respect others. (A)
Get chores done right away. (C)
Feel comfortable with myself. (N)*
Would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. (E)*
Avoid philosophical discussions. (O)*
Suspect hidden motives in others. (A)*
Do just enough work to get by. (C)*
Have frequent mood swings. (N)
Am the life of the party. (E)
Carry the conversation to a higher level. (O)
Accept people as they are. (A)
Carry out my plans. (C)
Am not easily bothered by things. (N)*
Don’t like to draw attention to myself. (E)*
Do not enjoy going to art museums. (O)*
Get back at others. (A)*
Don’t see things through. (C)*
Panic easily. (N)
Know how to captivate people. (E)
Enjoy hearing new ideas. (O)
Make people feel at ease. (A)
Make plans and stick to them. (C)
Am very pleased with myself. (N)*
Don’t talk a lot. (E)*
Tend to vote for conservative political candidates. (O)*
Insult people. (A)*
Shirk my duties. (C)*

Key:
Neuroticism = (N)
Extraversion = (E)
Openness = (O)
Agreeableness = (A)
Conscientiousness = (C)
*Reverse scored items.
Source: International Personality Item Pool: A Scientific Collaboratory for the
Development of Advanced Measures of Personality Traits and Other Individual
Differences (http://ipip.ori.org/).
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Appendix C
Affectivity (Positive, Negative)
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to each word.
Indicate to what extent you have felt this way during the past few weeks.
1

2

3

4

5

A Little

Moderately

Quite a Bit

Extremely

Very Slightly
or Not at All

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Interested
Distressed
Excited
Upset
Strong
Guilty
Scared
Hostile
Enthusiastic
Proud
Irritable
Alert
Ashamed
Inspired
Nervous
Determined
Attentive
Jittery
Active
Afraid

Positive Affect: Sum the responses to items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, and 19.
Negative Affect: Sum the responses to items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 18, and 20
Source: Watson et al., 1988
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Appendix D
Generalized Self-efficacy
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements about people’s beliefs that in general they can achieve
tasks and goals. Use the following scale to indicate how accurate each item reflects your own
beliefs about your ability to achieve various tasks and goals.

1

2

Strongly

Moderately

Disagree

3

4

Neutral

Moderately Agree

5
Strongly

Disagree

Agree

1. I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself.
2. When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them.
3. In general, I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me.
4. I believe I can succeed at most any endeavor to which I set my mind.
5. I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges.
6. I am confident that I can perform effectively on many different tasks.
7. Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well.
8. Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well.
Source: Chen, Gully, and Eden, 2001
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Appendix E
Goal Orientation
(Student Sample)

INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements describing people’s classroom behaviors. Please use
the following scale to indicate how accurate each statement reflects your own behavioral
tendencies.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly

Moderately

Slightly

Slightly

Moderately

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Agree

Agree

1. I am willing to select a challenging class assignment that I can learn a lot from.
2. I often look for opportunities to develop new skills and knowledge.
3. I enjoy challenging and difficult tasks at class where I’ll learn new skills.
4. For me, development of my academic ability is important enough to take risks.
5. I prefer to work in situations that require a high level of ability and talent.
6. I’m concerned with showing that I can perform better than my classmates.
7. I try to figure out what it takes to prove my ability to others in class.
8. I enjoy it when others in class are aware of how well I am doing.
9. I prefer to work on projects where I can prove my ability to others.
10. I would avoid taking on a new task if there was a chance I would appear rather incompetent
to others.
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11. Avoiding a show of low ability is more important to me than learning a new skill.
12. I’m concerned about taking on a task in class if my performance would reveal that I had low
ability.
13. I prefer to avoid situations in class where I might perform poorly.

Note: Learning goal orientation items are 1-5, prove-performance goal orientation items are 69, and avoid-performance goal orientation items are 10-13.
Source: VandeWalle (1997)

(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements describing people’s workplace behaviors. Please use
the following scale to indicate how accurate each statement reflects your own behavioral
tendencies.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Strongly

Moderately

Slightly

Slightly

Moderately

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Agree

Agree

1. I am willing to select a challenging work assignment that I can learn a lot from.
2. I often look for opportunities to develop new skills and knowledge.
3. I enjoy challenging and difficult tasks at work where I’ll learn new skills.
4. For me, development of my work ability is important enough to take risks.
5. I prefer to work in situations that require a high level of ability and talent.
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6. I’m concerned with showing that I can perform better than my coworkers.
7. I try to figure out what it takes to prove my ability to others at work.
8. I enjoy it when others at work are aware of how well I am doing.
9. I prefer to work on projects where I can prove my ability to others.
10. I would avoid taking on a new task if there was a chance that I would appear rather
incompetent to others.
11. Avoiding a show of low ability is more important to me than learning a new skill.
12. I’m concerned about taking on a task at work if my performance would reveal that I had
low ability.
13. I prefer to avoid situations at work where I might perform poorly.

Note: Learning goal orientation items are 1-5, prove-performance goal orientation items are 69, and avoid-performance goal orientation items are 10-13.
Source: VandeWalle (1997)
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Appendix F
Trait Anxiety
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: A number of statements people use to describe themselves are given below.
Read each statement and indicate the extent to which each statement describes how you generally
feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement
but give the answer that best describes your overall feelings best.

______________________________________________
1

2

3

Not at all

1.

I feel calm.*

2.

I am tense.

3.

I feel upset.

4.

I am relaxed.*

5.

I feel content.*

6.

I am worried.

4
Very Much

* = Reverse scored
Source: Marteau and Bekker (1992)
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Appendix G
Goal Level
(Student Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below you are to choose a grade goal for your final exam in PSYC 1010 and
for your final grade in the course. Indicate your grade goal on a 0-100 percentage scale.

Goal for final exam score (% of points on exam): _____

Goal for total points in class (% of total points): _____

(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below you are to choose a goal for your job performance, as if being graded
on a 0-100 scale like in school. Indicate your “grade” goal on a 0-100 percentage scale.

Job performance “grade” goal (0-100%): _______
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Appendix H
Goal Commitment
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements describing people’s feelings about goals. Please use the
rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes your feelings about the
grade goals you have just chosen.

1

2

Strongly

Moderately

Disagree

1.
2.
3.
4.

3

4

Neutral

Moderately Agree

5
Strongly

Disagree

Agree

It’s hard to take this goal seriously.
It’s unrealistic for me to expect to reach this goal.
It is quite likely that this goal may need to be revised, depending on how things go.
Quite frankly, I don’t care if I achieve this goal or not.

Source: Hollenbeck, Klein, O’Leary, and Wright (1989)
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Appendix I
Work Engagement

(Student Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements about experiences people have at college. Use the
following scale to indicate how frequently you experience each with respect to your
psychology course.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Always
Never
1. When I get up in the morning, I feel like going to class. (VI)
2. When I’m doing my work as a student, I feel bursting with energy. (VI)
3. As far as my studies are concerned I always persevere, even when things do not go well.
(VI)
4. I can continue studying for very long periods at a time. (VI)
5. I am very resilient, mentally, as far as my studies are concerned. (VI)
6. I feel strong and vigorous when I’m studying or going to class. (VI)
7. To me, my studies are challenging. (DE)
8. My study inspires me. (DE)
9. I am enthusiastic about my studies. (DE)
10. I am proud of my studies. (DE)
11. I find my studies full of meaning and purpose. (DE)
12. When I am studying, I forget everything else around me. (AB)
13. Time flies when I am studying. (AB)
14. I get carried away when I am studying. (AB)
15. It is difficult to detach myself from my studies. (AB)
16. I am immersed in my studies. (AB)
17. I feel happy when I am studying intensely. (AB)

Source: Schaufeli et al., 2002
Note: VI = Vigor facet, DE = Dedication facet, AB = Absorption facet
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(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements about experiences people have at work. Use the
following scale to indicate how frequently you experience each at work.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Always
Never

1. When I get up in the morning, I feel like going to work. (VI)
2. At my work, I feel bursting with energy. (VI)
3. At my work I always persevere, even when things do not go well. (VI)
4. I can continue working for very long periods of time. (VI)
5. At my job, I am very resilient, mentally. (VI)
6. At my job I feel strong and vigorous. (VI)
7. To me, my job is challenging. (DE)
8. My job inspires me. (DE)
9. I am enthusiastic about my job. (DE)
10. I am proud of the work that I do. (DE)
11. I find the work that I do full of meaning and purpose. (DE)
12. When I am working, I forget everything else around me. (AB)
13. Time flies when I am working. (AB)
14. I get carried away when I am working. (AB)
15. It is difficult to detach myself from my job. (AB)
16. I am immersed in my work. (AB)
17. I feel happy when I am working intensely. (AB)

Source: Schaufeli et al., 2002
Note: VI = Vigor facet, DE = Dedication facet, AB = Absorption facet
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Appendix J
Mind Wandering

(Student Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements about experiences people have in class. Use the
following scale to indicate how frequently you experience each while in your psychology class.

(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements about experiences people have at work. Use the
following scale to indicate how frequently you experience each while at work.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Almost

Very

Somewhat

Somewhat

Very

Almost

never

infrequently

infrequently

frequently

frequently

always

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

I have difficulty maintaining focus on simple or repetitive work.
While reading, I find I haven’t been thinking about the text and must therefore read it again.
I do things without paying full attention.
I find myself listening with one ear, thinking about something else at the same time.
I mind-wander during lectures or presentations.

Source: Mrazek et al., 2013
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Appendix K
Task-specific Self-efficacy

(Student Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements reflecting people’ ability to do tasks required by their
classes. Use the following scale to indicate how accurately each statement describes your
ability to perform the class-related tasks mentioned below.
1

2

Strongly

Moderately

Disagree

3

4

Neutral

Moderately Agree

5
Strongly

Disagree

Agree

1. I have confidence in my ability to do well in my introductory psychology (Psyc 1010) class.
2. There are some tasks required by my Psyc 1010 class that I cannot do well.*
3. When my grades are poor, it is due to my lack of ability.
4. I doubt my ability to do well in my Psyc 1010 class.*
5. I have all the skills needed to perform well in my Psyc 1010 class.
6. Most people in my class get better grades than I do.*
7. I am a great student.
8. My future in school is limited because of my lack of skills.*
9. I am very proud of my skills and abilities in school.
10. I feel threatened when others watch me take a test or do homework.*
*Reverse coded
Adapted from Riggs, Warka, Babasa, Betancourt, and Hooker (1994)
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(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements reflecting people’ ability to do tasks required by their
job. Use the following scale to indicate how accurately each statement describes your ability to
perform the work-related tasks mentioned below.
1

2

Strongly

Moderately

Disagree

Disagree

3

4

5
Strongly

Neutral

Moderately Agree
Agree

1. I have confidence in my ability to do well at my job.
2. There are some tasks required by my job that I cannot do well.*
3. When my job evaluations are poor, it is due to my lack of ability.
4. I doubt my ability to do well in my job.*
5. I have all the skills needed to perform well at my job.
6. Most people at my organization receive better evaluations than I do.*
7. I am a great worker.
8. My future in my current career is limited because of my lack of skills.*
9. I am very proud of my skills and abilities at work.
10. I feel threatened when others watch me work.*

*Reverse coded
Adapted from Riggs, Warka, Babasa, Betancourt, and Hooker (1994)
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Appendix L
Mindfulness
(Both Student and Work Samples)

INSTRUCTIONS: The purpose of this inventory is to characterize your experience of
mindfulness. Provide an answer the for every statement as best you can. Please answer as
honestly and spontaneously as possible. There are neither ‘right’ nor ‘wrong’ answers, nor
‘good’ or ‘bad’ responses. What is important to us is your own personal experience.

1

2

3

Rarely

Occasionally Fairly often

4
Almost
always

1. I am open to the experience of the present moment.
2. I sense my body, whether eating, cooking, cleaning or talking.
3. When I notice an absence of mind, I gently return to the experience of the here and now.
4. I am able to appreciate myself.
5. I pay attention to what’s behind my actions.
6. I see my mistakes and difficulties without judging them.
7. I feel connected to my experience in the here-and-now.
8. I accept unpleasant experiences.
9. I am friendly to myself when things go wrong.
10. I watch my feelings without getting lost in them.
11. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting.
12. I experience moments of inner peace and ease, even when things get hectic and stressful.
13. I am impatient with myself and with others.
14. I am able to smile when I notice how I sometimes make life difficult.

Source: Walach, Buchheld, Grossman and Schmidt (2006)
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Appendix M
Boredom
(Student Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: When answering the following, please consider your work in your
psychology course.

1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

2

3

4

5

Almost

Almost

never

always

I think my work is boring.
There are long periods of boredom in my psychology course lab and/or lecture.
My psychology course goes by slowly.
I often get bored with my work.
The time seems to go by slowly when I’m in my psychology course lab and/or lecture.

Source: Adapted from Van Hooft and Van Hooft (2014)
(Work Sample)
INSTRUCTIONS: When answering the following, please consider your current job and work.

1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

2

3

4

5

Almost

Almost

never

always

I think my work is boring.
There are long periods of boredom on my job
My job goes by slowly
I often get bored with my work
The time seems to go by slowly when I’m at work.

Source: Van Hooft and Van Hooft (2014)
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Appendix N
Metacognition
(Both Student and Work Samples)
INSTRUCTIONS: Below are statements describing people’s behaviors. Please use the
following scale to indicate how accurate each statement reflects your own behavioral tendencies.

1

2

3

4

Agree
Do not agree

Agree slightly

Agree very much
moderately

1. I am constantly aware of my thinking.
2. I pay close attention to the way my mind works.
3. I think a lot about my thoughts.
4. I constantly examine my thoughts.
5. I monitor my thoughts.
6. I am aware of the way my mind works when I am thinking through a problem.

Source: Wells and Cartwright-Hatton (2004)

116

Appendix O
In-Role Behavior Performance
(Work Sample)

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read the following statements carefully. Use the scale below to
indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements.

1 (Strongly Disagree)……………………………………………………….…7 (Strongly Agree)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I adequately complete assigned duties.
I fulfill the responsibilities specified in my job description.
I perform tasks that are expected of myself.
I meet formal performance requirements of the job.
I engage in activities that will directly affect my performance evaluation.
I neglect aspects of the job I am obligated to perform. *
I fail to perform essential duties. *

Note. * reversed scored.
Source: Williams and Anderson, 1991
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Appendix P
Consent Form
(Student Sample)
Investigators: Kent Etherton (Etherton.4@wright.edu)
WSU Psychology Department, Fawcett Hall Room 335,
Dayton, OH 45435

Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson (debra.steele-johnson@wright.edu)
WSU Psychology Department, Fawcett Hall Room 335,
Dayton, OH 45435

Study site: Online at a time and location of your choosing

If you have general questions about giving consent or your rights as a research participant in this
research study, you can call the Wright State University Institutional Review Board at 937-7754462.

Background Information:

You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted by Kent
Etherton (student in the WSU IO/HF PhD Program) and Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson.
Approximately 400 subjects will be invited to participate.
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Purpose

The purpose of this research study is to examine the effects of various personality variables on
performance-related behaviors.

Procedure

In this study, you will be asked to complete several online questionnaires. You will receive
SONA research credits for completing all of the questionnaires. These surveys will be used to
measure aspects of your personality, motivation, and academic ability. You may decline to
answer any questions that may make you uncomfortable. This study will take approximately 1
hour to complete.

Potential Risks

There is minimal risk and discomfort anticipated as part of or as a result of this research study.
The primary risk is fatigue resulting from responding to the questionnaires. Any information
about you obtained from this study will be kept strictly confidential and you will not be
identified in any report or publication.

Benefits
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The possible benefits of this study include the gaining of knowledge about human psychology
that can improve individual performance. The information collected may not benefit you
directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. You will receive the
benefit of SONA credits for completing this study. The information learned in this study may be
helpful to others.

Compensation

You will receive 2 SONA credits for your time while you are in this study.

Confidentiality

Total privacy cannot be guaranteed. We will protect your privacy to the extent permitted by law.
If the results from this study are published, your name will not be made public. Once your
information leaves our institution, we cannot promise that others will keep it private. Results of
the study will show only aggregated (combined) data. No individual results will be available.

Your information may be shared with the following:

•
•

The Wright State IRB and Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)

Security
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To ensure data collected is secured, your data will be kept in a either a password protected
computer or the password protected SONA system.

Voluntary Participation

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be
in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you
stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.

Research Subject’s Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints

You may contact the principal investigator, Kent Etherton, at etherton.4@wright.edu and his
faculty advisor, Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson, at debra.steele-johnson@wright.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a study subject, questions, concerns or complaints,
you may call the Wright State IRB Office (937) 775-4462. You may discuss any questions about
your rights as a subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an independent committee
composed of members of the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as lay
members of the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this
study.

This form tells you what will happen during the study if you choose to take part. We also ask for
your permission to get information about your academic performance (course grade and GPA).

121

Clicking the “I Agree” button below and continuing with the questionnaires implies that this
study has been discussed with you, that your questions have been answered, that you give us
permission to get information about your academic performance, and that you will take part in
the study. This informed consent document is not a contract. You are not giving up any legal
rights by signing this informed consent document. Your decision to participate or to not
participate will not adversely affect your standing at this institution or cause a loss of benefits to
which you might otherwise be entitled. There is no penalty of any kind for either nonparticipation or withdrawal at any time. You may request a copy of this consent to keep for your
records by contacting the primary investigator, Kent Etherton.

Please indicate your agreement to participate in this study. If you choose not to participate
you may close your browser now.

I agree to participate in this study.

(Work Sample)
Investigators: Kent Etherton (etherton.4@wright.edu)
WSU Psychology Department, Fawcett Hall Room 335,
Dayton, OH 45435

Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson (debra.steele-johnson@wright.edu)
WSU Psychology Department, Fawcett Hall Room 335,
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Dayton, OH 45435

Study site: Online at a time and location of your choosing

If you have general questions about giving consent or your rights as a research participant in this
research study, you can call the Wright State University Institutional Review Board at 937-7754462.

Background Information:

You are invited to participate in a research study. The study is being conducted by Kent
Etherton (student in the WSU IO/HF PhD Program) and Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson.
Approximately 400 subjects will be invited to participate.

Purpose

The purpose of this research study is to examine the effects of various personality variables on
performance-related behaviors.

Procedure

In this study, you will be asked to complete several online questionnaires. Completion of the
online surveys is self-paced. You may leave the survey and return to complete it at any time, so
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long as the study is still open. If you leave the survey, you must use the same device (i.e., the
same phone or laptop) to complete the survey. You will receive $0.50 for completing all of the
questionnaires. These surveys will be used to measure aspects of your personality, motivation,
and job performance. You may decline to answer any questions that may make you
uncomfortable. This study will take approximately 1 hour to complete.

Potential Risks

There is minimal risk and discomfort anticipated as part of or as a result of this research study.
The primary risk is fatigue resulting from responding to the questionnaires. Additionally, some
items may cause discomfort or result in positive or negative feelings. Any information about you
obtained from this study will be kept strictly confidential and you will not be identified in any
report or publication.

Benefits

The possible benefits of this study include the gaining of knowledge about human psychology
that can improve individual performance. The knowledge gained may not benefit you directly.
The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. You will receive the benefit of
$0.50 for completing this study.

Compensation
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You will receive $0.50 for your time while you are in this study.

Confidentiality

Total privacy cannot be guaranteed. We will protect your privacy to the extent permitted by law.
If the results from this study are published, your name will not be made public. Once your
information leaves our institution, we cannot promise that others will keep it private. Results of
the study will show only aggregated (combined) data. No individual results will be available.

Your information may be shared with the following:

•
•

The Wright State IRB and Office of Research and Sponsored Programs
Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP)

Security

To ensure data collected is secured, your data will be kept in either a password protected
computer or the password protected Amazon MTURK system.

Voluntary Participation

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be
in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you
stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.

125

Research Subject’s Rights, Questions, Concerns, and Complaints

You may contact the principal investigator, Kent Etherton, at etherton.4@wright.edu and his
faculty advisor, Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson, at debra.steele-johnson@wright.edu.

If you have any questions about your rights as a subject, questions, concerns or complaints, you
may call the Wright State IRB Office (937) 775-4462. You may discuss any questions about
your rights as a subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an independent committee
composed of members of the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as lay
members of the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this
study.

This form tells you what will happen during the study if you choose to take part. Clicking the “I
Agree” button below and continuing with the questionnaires implies that this study has been
discussed with you, that your questions have been answered, and that you will take part in the
study. This informed consent document is not a contract. You are not giving up any legal rights
by signing this informed consent document. Your decision to participate or to not participate
will not cause a loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be entitled. There is no penalty of
any kind for either non-participation or withdrawal at any time. You may request a copy of this
consent to keep for your records by contacting the primary investigator, Kent Etherton at
Etherton.4@wright.edu
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Please indicate your agreement to participate in this study. If you choose not to participate
you may close your browser now.

I agree to participate in this study.
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Appendix Q
Debriefing Form
(Both Student and Work Samples)
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

The experiment you just completed examines the relationships between various personality
variables and performance-related behaviors.

Prior research has examined relationships between personality variables and motivational
variables and behavior in organizations. We are interested in whether some of these personality
variables are better predictors of motivation and performance.

With data from you and other individuals, we are discovering more about how personality might
relate to motivation and performance in organizations.

Please do not discuss these surveys with anyone else because it is important that future
participants know nothing about the experiment before they participate in the same experiment.
The data you provide today is important to us, and we appreciate your help. If you have any
questions or comments about today’s experiments, please talk to the researcher, Kent Etherton at
etherton.4@wright.edu or contact Dr. Debra Steele-Johnson at debra.steele-johnson@wright.edu.
Thank you for your time and cooperation.
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